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
A SYSTEM FOR EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF RVNAF

## PART I.

ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN).  
VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS (VNMC).  
VIETNAMESE NAVY (VNN).

3D QTR CY 70

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MACJ3-051

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1. This report is prepared quarterly to provide COMUSMACV, MACV staff agencies and advisors with an evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF).
2. The content of the USMACV SEER Report is derived from operational statistics and responses to quarterly questionnaires submitted by senior advisors as a part of the MACV System for Evaluating the Effectiveness of RVNAF (SEER). This part of the report contains ARVN/VNMC and VMN evaluations. The Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) portion of this report is published under separate cover as Part II.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl  
USMACV SEER Report, Part I,  
3d Qtr CY 70

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JOHN P. GAGNE  
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PART 1: ARVN/VNMC AND VNN FORCES

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- A. Enemy Contacts
- B. Enemy Initiated Incidents and Results
- C. Effort, Results and Caches Discovered
- D. Advisors' Assessment Tables
- E. Combat Support Received

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## 1. (U-FOUO) INTRODUCTION.

a. Coverage. This report addresses the operational effectiveness of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), the Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC), the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), and the Vietnamese Navy (VNN) during 3d Qtr CY 70. The Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) portion of the report is published as Part II. The status and performance of Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF) are covered in separate reports, the most comprehensive of which is the MACCORDS Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) Monthly Evaluation Summary Report.

## b. Data and Information Sources.

(1) General. Operational statistics are derived from the SEER Monthly Operational Statistics Reports submitted to MACV by US advisors assigned to ARVN/VNMC units. Significant problem areas are reported quarterly by corps senior advisors. Assessments of operational effectiveness, leadership, training, staff functions and problem areas of ARVN and VNMC units are derived from advisors' responses to the SEER quarterly questionnaire. Enemy force strength data is obtained from MACJ2. Friendly force strength data is received from MACJ3 and the Territorial Forces Evaluation System. Input for the naval forces portion of this report is received from the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Vietnam, and the Senior Naval Advisor to the Vietnamese Navy, in the form of monthly and quarterly reports.

(2) Revised MACV SEER Questionnaire. This questionnaire was completely revised in late 1969 and provides a greater range of information for evaluating important areas of command interest in ARVN/VNMC effectiveness. In addition, the new questionnaire now has specific questions answered by advisors at all basic command levels (infantry and artillery battalion, regiment, brigade, division and corps). During the developmental stages, various field organizations were contacted for assistance and their recommendations incorporated into the final questionnaire. The new questionnaire was implemented on a test basis during the fourth quarter 1969 reporting period, providing an overlap of old and new data bases, and allowing the old and new results to be directly compared. The new questionnaire provides a more precise measurement of many attributes of ARVN/VNMC units covered by the old questionnaire, as well as expanded coverage into areas previously not considered. Hence, the evaluations derived from the two questionnaires are not identical, and those trend lines displayed in this report which cover several quarters may have a discontinuity in the 4th Qtr CY 69. Likewise, the fourth quarter evaluations shown on charts derived from the questionnaire are not those displayed in 4th Qtr CY 69 MACV SEER Report, but have been derived from the new questionnaire.

c. Factors Influencing Performance. Many factors, such as differences in terrain, size of areas, enemy/friendly density, level of activity, weather, and tactics employed by opposing forces affect the results as shown in this report.

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### 2. (C-NOFORN) SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE.

#### a. Effectiveness.

(1) Allocation of Effort. During the third quarter 1970 the level of effort devoted to combat operations decreased slightly to 56 percent, while time spent on active pacification remained constant at approximately seven percent. Eighteen percent of the ARVN/VNMC effort was expended on security missions. Training time doubled, while reserve and rehabilitation effort decreased slightly.

(2) Contacts and Enemy Initiated Incidents. Country-wide enemy contacts by ARVN infantry battalions totaled 1,771 in the third quarter, dropping below the second quarter figure of 2,481. The percentage of contacts with enemy units of platoon-size or smaller increased slightly this quarter to 77 percent, while battalion-size contacts decreased to six percent. There was a decrease in the number of enemy initiated incidents against ARVN/VNMC units during the third quarter.

(3) Operational Results. Results during the third quarter decreased sharply from last quarter. Enemy eliminated and weapons captured dropped back to the first quarter levels. Friendly losses decreased even more sharply than enemy eliminated, resulting in a new high for the casualty ratio. This ratio has been in a general uptrend since the second quarter 1969. Cache finds dropped sharply this quarter, to pre-Cambodian levels. Caches found in Cambodia this quarter accounted for approximately one third of the total cache finds.

(4) Operational Effectiveness. The US advisors' assessments of operational effectiveness are subjective evaluations of how well their units perform the mechanics of warfare and are not necessarily indicative of the operational results achieved by those units; operational results are also influenced by the environment, enemy, combat support received, and mission assigned. The average operational effectiveness assessment for the third quarter remained approximately the same as the previous quarter.

(5) Unit Performance. Highlighted as the top performing units during the third quarter are the 1st, 2nd, 7th, and 21st Divisions. All second quarter leaders (the 9th and 25th Divisions, the armored cavalry and the Marines) dropped from the top group this quarter as the opportunities in Cambodia were depleted.

#### b. Problem Areas.

(1) Leadership. The leadership evaluation of ARVN/VNMC is developed from the quarterly questionnaire submitted by advisors. The quality of leadership has generally improved during the quarter, but continues to be a problem among lower ranking officers and noncommissioned officers. Specialized leadership courses at division training centers, and increased numbers of small unit operations, are serving to correct this deficiency. This problem reveals itself in many ways, the most serious of which is the

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lack of aggressiveness demonstrated by many organizations. During the third quarter, 10 percent of the battalion advisors reported that their units were not aggressive when in contact with the enemy. The overall ARVN/VNMC maneuver battalion leadership assessment has increased slightly during the third quarter. The leadership problem continues to be reported as greater in ARVN infantry battalions than in special units.

(2) Training. The total time spent in training by ARVN battalions doubled from the second quarter. The quality of training showed regression during the third quarter, however, with all categories receiving a larger percentage of "poor" ratings from advisors than in the second quarter. An accelerated program to provide battalion refresher training was planned for 1970, but increased combat activity caused cancellation of approximately half of this training.

(3) Inadequacies within Division, Regiment, and Battalion Staffs. During the third quarter, substantial numbers of advisors still reported G2/S2, G3/S3, and G4/S4 functions to be inadequate. A greater percentage of advisors reported inadequacies within battalion staffs than in regimental and division staffs.

(4) Intelligence. The intelligence functions at all staff levels continued to be reported as a major staff problem. The intelligence collection effort of ARVN battalions was reported as slightly more effective this quarter than during the second quarter, but the intelligence received from higher headquarters was frequently untimely.

(5) Casualties Due to Mines and Booby Traps. In the third quarter, deaths from mines and booby traps decreased, but since total friendly KIA decreased even more, the percent of total casualties due to mines and booby traps increased to 26 percent. MR 4 units still sustain a large number of casualties from these devices.

(6) Maneuver Battalion Strength. Strength in the major combat elements of ARVN/VNMC decreased by approximately 2,000 men in the third quarter. The desertion rate in ARVN/VNMC major combat elements rose from 35 per 1,000 assigned at the beginning of the third quarter to 38 per 1,000 assigned at the end of the third quarter. Desertions in the major combat elements of ARVN/VNMC continued to be a major problem and constituted the greatest single source of manpower loss in RVNAF.

(7) Logistics. Failure to properly exercise the ARVN supply system continued to be a major problem area. This is especially noticeable in that portion of the system dealing with requisitioning and distributing major items of equipment and repair parts. The number of artillery units reporting a shortage of repair parts as a major problem fell from 53 percent during the second quarter to 43 percent during the third quarter. The number of maneuver battalions reporting the same problems dropped from 48 percent to 47 percent in the third quarter. Each MR reported at least one serious problem resulting from the unresponsiveness of the ARVN supply system. Many supply problems continued to be surfaced through advisor actions; the ARVN supply system remained

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unresponsive and frequently unaware of the requirements of the units it supports.

(8) Unit Performance. The 5th and 23d Divisions and the 51st Regiment displayed relatively low performance during the quarter.

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
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## 3. (C-NOFORN) ARMY AND MARINE FORCES EVALUATION.

a. Environmental Aspects. On the following pages are environmental conditions and characteristics for each military region. These conditions are considered important in analyzing results and performance of ARVN/VNMC units. Charts 1, 2, 3, and 4 show the average numbers of enemy and friendly maneuver battalions present in each TAOR during the second quarter, relative strength of enemy and friendly maneuver elements, and enemy and friendly densities in each TAOR. Friendly strengths are subdivided to show FMMAF, ARVN, and RF/PF-CIDG. Enemy strengths are subdivided to show NVA/VC infantry and guerrilla elements and are computed to include all enemy maneuver elements less headquarters. Arrows indicate previous quarter strengths.

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Chart 1



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## MILITARY REGION 1 ENVIRONMENT

### CONDITIONS

### CHARACTERISTICS

#### Terrain

The Chaine Annamitique Mountains dominate the area. Rain forests covering the mountains offer refuge to the enemy. In the west, the Chaine Annamitique grades into rolling upland plains, with altitudes between 1,500 and 3,000 feet above sea level. In the east, the mountains drop off sharply to narrow coastal plains.

#### Weather

The weather in MR 1 was influenced by the southwest monsoons until late in September. West and south of the main ridgeline, significant cloudiness, patchy fog and stratus occurred regularly during July; afternoon hours were marked by thunderstorm and shower activity along the ridgelines. August and September had generally good flying weather, until the advent of the northeast monsoon in late September brought some heavy rains to the coastal region.

#### Population

The majority of the population of about 3.0 million (17 percent of the national total) is settled along the coast. Da Nang and Hue are the only major cities in the area.

#### GVN Control

Relatively secure: hamlets 90.4 percent; population 95.5 percent.

#### Enemy Forces

The total enemy strength remained about the same as last quarter; however, there was an increase of one NVA battalion. The 1st Division's TAOR has the highest enemy density in-country.

#### Friendly Forces

The total friendly strength increased approximately five percent over the 2d Qtr CY 70 figures. CIDG strength of 3,496 is included in the RF/PF totals.

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## Chart 2



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## MILITARY REGION 2 ENVIRONMENT

### CONDITIONS

### CHARACTERISTICS

Terrain	The largest of the military regions, MR 2 is characterized by the diverse terrain features consisting of coastal plains, highland plateaus, mountains and dense jungles. The area is, for the most part, sparsely populated and underdeveloped.
Weather	MR 2 had similar weather to that reported for MR 1. The mountain areas had poor to marginal weather, 10 days in July, 26 days in August and 28 days in September. The coastal areas were almost invariably marked by good flying weather.
Population	The majority of the population of about 3.2 million (18 percent of the national total) is settled along the coast. Qui Nhon and Nha Trang are the major cities of the coastal area. The population inland is largely Montagnard.
GVN Control	Relatively secure: hamlets 81.7 percent; population 90.1 percent.
Enemy Forces	The number of enemy battalions in the region increased by four (two NVA, two Sapper). Total number of enemy increased by about six percent. The 23d Division's TAOR continues to have the lowest enemy density in-country.
Friendly Forces	The 23d Division's TAOR also had the lowest friendly troop density of all TAORs and STZs. There was a substantial increase (9.9 percent) in total friendly strength during the quarter. CIDG strength of 7,751 is included in the RF/PF totals.

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## MILITARY REGION 3 ENVIRONMENT

### CONDITIONS

### CHARACTERISTICS

#### Terrain

The MR 3 area is one of transition. The southern portion consists of rich, flat lands which flood during the rainy season. In the eastern regions, there are mangrove swamps, dense forests, and rubber plantations. In the northwestern areas, the terrain becomes mountainous with elevations up to 1,500 feet.

#### Weather

The mountainous area of northern and western MR 3 experienced a pattern of fog and stratus causing poor to marginal weather similar to that of the mountains of MR 2, although not to the degree of severity in affecting operations. The lower areas of MR 3 had substantially better weather during July and August, with a total of only 10 out of 62 days reported as persistently poor or marginal. Early September was marked with poor to marginal weather, which improved at the end of the quarter.

#### Population

MR 3 has the second largest population, about 5.2 million (30 percent of the national total), and includes the national capital (Saigon) with a population of about 2.2 million.

#### GVN Control

Relatively secure: hamlets 98.4 percent; population 99.3 percent.

#### Enemy Forces

Total enemy strength decreased about five percent from last quarter; the number of sapper battalions increased by five, but total number of battalions increased by two.

#### Friendly Forces

Total friendly strength increased by more than 12 percent. CIDG strength of 4,418 is included in the RF/PF totals.



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## MILITARY REGION 4 ENVIRONMENT

### CONDITIONS

### CHARACTERISTICS

Terrain	MR 4 includes the delta of the Bassac and Mekong Rivers. The area is covered almost entirely with swamps, marshes and rice fields. The shoreline is marked by long stretches of mangrove swamps, beyond which mud flats stretch for some distance at low tide. Nearly all of the Delta is less than 10 feet above sea level, and the rise and fall of the tide is noticeable in the rivers and canals throughout the area. The unimproved areas of swamps, mangrove forest and jungle afford sanctuary to the enemy.
Weather.	The delta had generally favorable weather throughout the quarter, with the exception of only 10 days of poor or marginal weather. September, in particular, had only one day of marginal weather.
Population	MR 4 has the largest population with about 6.0 million (35 percent of the national total). The Delta is the major farming area and producer of rice.
GVN Control	Relatively secure: hamlets 84.9 percent; population 91.4 percent.
Enemy Forces	Although the number of NVA battalions increased by two during the quarter, the total enemy strength decreased by seven percent. The 7th Division's TAOR has the second highest enemy density in the country.
Friendly Forces	The 7th Division's TAOR continues to have the highest friendly troop density of all TAORs. Total friendly strength in MR 4 increased about 11 percent.

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### b. Enemy Initiated Incidents.

(1) Enemy initiated incidents against ARVN infantry battalions decreased to 284 this quarter; this indicates a return to the downward trend started during the 2d Qtr CY 69 (Chart 5).

(2) Chart 6 illustrates the number and type of incidents directed against ARVN infantry units, by military region, during the last four quarters. Daytime incidents continued to constitute the major percentage of all incidents. Regional assessments are as follows:

(a) Military Region 1. Enemy initiated incidents increased over last quarter. Of the 142 incidents reported, attacks by fire was high with 124 of which 103 were during the day. MR 1 experienced the greatest number of enemy initiated incidents.

(b) Military Region 2. MR 2 experienced a sharp decline in enemy initiated incidents this quarter. Approximately 50 percent of their incidents were attacks by fire during daylight hours. Incidents were about equally distributed between both TAORs.

(c) Military Region 3. MR 3 continued to experience the least number of enemy incidents among the four MRs. Units reported a total of 21 incidents, of which 15 were assaults and ambushes and six attacks by fire. The majority of the assaults and ambushes were daylight.


(d) Military Region 4. Enemy initiated incidents decreased sharply this quarter, especially in assaults and ambushes. The 21st Division accounted for 19 of the 25 incidents reported.

(3) Annex B contains a detailed tabulation of enemy initiated incidents.

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Chart 5



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## c. Contacts.


(1) Country-wide enemy contacts by ARVN infantry battalions decreased from 2,481 in the second quarter CY 70 to 1,771 during the third quarter (Chart 7). MR 3 units experienced the least number of enemy contacts among the MRs.

(2) The percent of contacts with enemy units of platoon-size and smaller increased again this quarter from 73 percent to 77 percent of the total contacts. This denotes the enemy's increased reliance on the employment of small unit tactics throughout the battle area, as opposed to massing his forces into battalion-size operations.

(3) Battalion-size enemy contacts decreased in the third quarter almost as sharply as they had increased the second quarter. The fluctuation of battalion-size operations was due to the DAK SEANG operation in MR 2 during the second quarter and the Cambodian operations. Sixteen percent of the battalion contacts were in Cambodia this quarter.

(4) Annex A contains a detailed tabulation of enemy contacts and results.

Chart 7



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## d. Effort.

(1) Percent of Time on Missions Country-wide. Chart 8 shows the average battalion effort on missions country-wide for ARVN/VNMC organizations, and trends since January 1969. There was a slight decrease in time spent on combat operations this quarter. Time spent on security, static pacification, and active pacification remained relatively the same as last quarter. Reserve, training, and rehabilitation time increased slightly due to the decline in combat time.

(2) Percent of Time Spent on Missions Within Each Military Region. Chart 9 shows a comparison of time spent on each mission by ARVN infantry units with an indication of the changes since last quarter.

(a) Military Region 1. Total time spent on combat operations decreased slightly this quarter. The 1st and 2d Divisions increased combat operations by two and eight percent respectively, while the 51st Regiment decreased its amount of time in this activity by 20 percent. Total time devoted to security missions increased due to the 51st Regiment spending 50 percent of its time on security.

(b) Military Region 2. Overall combat operations by II Corps units decreased slightly. Time spent on security and active pacification also declined. Time spent in reserve, training, and rehabilitation increased significantly from 13 percent to 25 percent. The 22d and 23d Divisions almost tripled their time spent on training this quarter. Static pacification decreased from 10 to four percent. For over a year, the II Corps units have devoted the least amount of time to combat operations of all the corps.

(c) Military Region 3. Time spent on combat operations decreased for the first time in two years; however, III Corps units continued to devote more time to combat operations than any other military region. Security and reserve, training and rehabilitation increased, while active and static pacification decreased slightly.


(d) Military Region 4. Time spent on combat operations by IV Corps units continued its downward trend from 56 percent in the second quarter CY 70 to 52 percent this quarter. The 9th Division was the exception to the downward trend, as it increased its time spent on combat operations by approximately 12 percent. Time spent on security doubled this quarter in comparison to the second quarter. Active and static pacification also increased slightly while reserve, training, and rehabilitation dropped to 16 percent.

(3) Comparison of Time Spent on Missions by ARVN Infantry Battalions. Table 1 shows the major ARVN organizations with the most and least time spent on each mission by their organic infantry battalions. Complete data indicating time spent on each mission are contained in Annex C.



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Chart 8



DISTRIBUTION OF EFFORT




Chart 9

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TABLE 1

## COMPARISON OF TIME SPENT ON MISSIONS BY ARVN INFANTRY BATTALIONS

<u>MISSION</u>	<u>MOST TIME</u>	<u>LEAST TIME</u>
Combat Operations	1st Div (81%)	22d Div (32%)
Security	51 Regt (50%)	25th Div (5%)
Active Pacification	21st Div (20%)	1st, 5th, 9th, 18th Div (0%)
Static Pacification	2d Div (5%)	1st, 5th, 7th, 18th, 25th, Divs, and 51st Regt (0%)
Training	22d Div (14%)	51st Regt (1%)
Reserve/Rehabilitation	21st Div (15%)	1st Div (1%)

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## c. Combined and Unilateral Combat operations (Chart 10).

(1) The percent of time spent on combined (US/ARVN) combat operations continued to decline this quarter. The number of unilateral operations also declined, but still maintains a high average for CY 70.


(2) Military Region 1. I Corps units increased unilateral operations this quarter from 65 to 66 percent. The 1st Division accounted for 80 percent of the unilateral operations in MR 1. Combined operations decreased again this quarter to less than one percent.

(3) Military Region 2. The II Corps units continue to spend the least amount of effort on unilateral operations. However, they led all units in combined operations with an increase of three percent this quarter. The 23d Division was high for II Corps units in unilateral operations, while the 22d Division led in combined operations.

(4) Military Region 3. III Corps units led all corps in time spent on unilateral operations. The 5th Division led III Corps units on unilateral operations, spending 73 percent of its effort in that area. Time spent on combined operations increased less than one percent.

(5) Military Region 4. All combat operations by IV Corps units were unilateral since there were no US ground combat units in the Delta. IV Corps units devoted 53 percent of their effort to unilateral operations; the 9th Division led all MR 4 units in unilateral operation effort at 71 percent.

Chart 10



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
## f. Results.

(1) US and GVN Regular Forces Casualty Ratios. A comparison of US and GVN regular forces (ARVN/VNMC, VNAF and VNN) casualty ratios which are made up of enemy eliminated (killed, captured, and surrendered) divided by friendly losses (killed and missing), based on country-wide statistics (Measurement of Progress data), is shown in Chart 11. Both the US and GVN ratios dropped this quarter.

(2) Enemy Eliminated. Chart 12 shows the country-wide average battalion results achieved by ARVN/VNMC in terms of enemy eliminated. Enemy eliminated had established a gradual uptrend from 3d Qtr CY 69 through 1st Qtr CY 70; in 2d Qtr CY 70 it more than doubled because of the successful Cambodian operations and increased enemy activity in the Republic. Third quarter enemy eliminated reverted approximately to pre-Cambodian levels as enemy activity subsided and the Cambodian opportunity diminished. Friendly losses were lower than last quarter, and the casualty ratio reached a new high of 7.6:1. The 1st, 2d, 7th, and 21st Divisions had the largest number of total enemy eliminated during the quarter. Chart 13 shows enemy eliminated per battalion for division and other major units.


(3) Weapons Captured. Chart 12 also shows that the number of weapons captured (excluding caches) per battalion decreased as did the number of weapons lost; however, the weapons ratio rose to the highest level in over two years. The 1st Division captured the largest number of weapons, followed by the 2d and 21st Divisions.

Chart 11



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
Chart 12



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Chart 13



▼ PREVIOUS QTR


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## (4) Caches.

(a) Chart 14 indicates weapons found in caches by ARVN/VMC units country-wide since 1st Qtr CY 69. The number of weapons found in caches decreased sharply to a new low for CY 69 and CY 70. The 21st and 2d Divisions reported the largest finds of weapons this quarter. Twenty-eight percent of all cache weapons were found in Cambodia.

(b) The tonnage of food and ammunition found in caches is displayed in Chart 14 also. Thirty-three percent of these items were captured in Cambodia. The ranger units accounted for the greatest amount of food, and the 18th Division for the greatest amount of ammunition found in caches.

Chart 14



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(5) Ambushes. Chart 15 depicts the numbers of ambushes conducted by organizations of each corps during the third quarter.


(a) Military Region 1. A total of 18,706 ambushes were conducted by I Corps units during the 3d Qtr CY 70. Seventy-seven percent of these ambushes were conducted at night. The 51st Regiment conducted 663 ambushes per battalion.

(b) Military Region 2. II Corps units conducted a total of 26,066 ambushes, 89 percent of which were night operations. The 22d Division led in this area with an average of 830 ambushes per battalion.

(c) Military Region 3. A total of 28,345 ambushes were conducted by III Corps units during the quarter. Ninety-five percent of these ambushes were conducted at night. The 18th Division had 796 ambushes per battalion.

(d) Military Region 4. A total of 9,046 ambushes were carried out by IV Corps units. Ninety-five percent of these ambushes were conducted at night. The 7th Division had 307 ambushes per battalion.

Chart 15






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## g. Combat Support.

(1) Country-wide. Chart 16 depicts combat support provided to ARVN/VNMC from 4th Qtr CY 69 through 3d Qtr CY 70, as reported by battalion advisors. All types of combat support decreased from the previous quarter. The percent of support attributable to RVNAF decreased in both categories of air support, but remained at 86 percent in artillery support.

Chart 16



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(2) Chart 17 shows the combat support provided ARVN in each military region.

(a) Military Region 1. Combat support employed by I Corps battalions decreased in two of the three support categories for the first time in a year. The percent of artillery support provided by RVNAF decreased to 71 percent compared to 80 percent in the previous quarter. The 1st Division continued to receive the greatest amount of artillery support in MR 1 and repeated as the second greatest user among ARVN infantry organizations; it also received the most tactical air/helicopter gunship support. The 2d Division received the most helicopter lift support in MR 1.

(b) Military Region 2. There was a decrease in all combat support provided to II Corps units. RVNAF resources provided 75 percent of the artillery support, a decrease from last quarter. The 23d Division was the greater user of helicopter lift and tactical air/helicopter gunship support. The 22d Division received the most artillery support. RVNAF increased its combat support in tactical air/helicopter gunship by three percent and helicopter lift by 10 percent in MR 2.

(c) Military Region 3. Combat support employed by III Corps battalions decreased in each category this quarter. The percent of tactical air/helicopter gunship support provided by RVNAF rose by one percent and artillery support decreased by 10 percent. For the third consecutive quarter, the 5th Division employed the greatest amount of artillery in MR 3. The 25th Division used the most tactical air/helicopter gunship support in RVNAF.


(d) Military Region 4. Combat support provided IV Corps battalions continued to decrease in the categories of helicopter lift and tactical air/helicopter gunship. RVNAF resources continued to provide 100 percent of the artillery support, which was the highest in over a year at 3,410 rounds per battalion. The 7th Division battalions received the greatest amount of artillery and helicopter lift support among ARVN infantry organizations.

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Chart 17

COMBAT SUPPORT PROVIDED ARVN INF (PER BN)



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
### h. Operational Effectiveness Assessments.

(1) The US advisors' assessments of operational effectiveness are subjective evaluations of how well their units perform the mechanics of warfare, and are not necessarily indicative of the operational results achieved by those units, which are influenced also by the environment, enemy situation, combat support received, and mission assigned. The average operational effectiveness for the third quarter showed a slight increase from the previous quarter. Chart 18 shows the trend in the ARVN/VNMC average since the first quarter 1969. The discontinuity in the fourth quarter was caused by a change in evaluations given some ARVN units by advisors in the revised SEER quarterly questionnaire.

(2) The lower assessments awarded MR 3 and MR 4 infantry units were balanced by the higher assessments of MR 1 and MR 2 infantry units so that the overall infantry assessment was unchanged from last quarter (Chart 19). Among ARVN special organizations, the airborne and armored cavalry assessments increased, while the ranger and Marine evaluations dropped off. Advisors' assessments of airborne units showed the greatest increase and were highest in-country.


(3) Annex D contains detailed assessment tables derived from the quarterly questionnaire.

Chart 18



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Chart 19



▼ PREVIOUS QUARTER

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### i. Division, Regiment and Battalion Staff Element Evaluations.

(1) Chart 20 compares the effectiveness of division and regimental staff functions among the four military regions on a percentage scale, and Chart 21 contains the same information for infantry battalion staffs. Ratings were computed for selected staff sections, the command and control function, and an overall command and staff average. A staff element, such as G1/S1, can be compared between military regions because advisors answered the same set of questions. Different staff elements cannot be directly compared because the ratings are based upon different sets of questions. The battalions have experienced greater difficulty in staff operations than divisions and regiments and are therefore portrayed separately. Staff element problem areas are analyzed by specific function in paragraph 4e.

(2) Regiments/Divisions (Chart 20). In the third quarter, MR 1 staffs again received the highest overall rating, but regressed from the previous quarter. MR 2 staffs exhibited gains for every staff function except G1/S1, and it was the only region to show an overall improvement during the quarter. MR 3 staffs regressed in all areas, and were above average only in the G1/S1 functional area. MR 4 was below average in each area and had the lowest overall rating of all regions.

(3) Infantry Battalions (Chart 21). MR 1 battalion staffs showed regression from the previous quarter in all functions except S4, but their overall rating was still above average. MR 2 staffs were highest overall, with every function showing an increase from the second quarter. MR 3 staffs had a substantial drop in the S4 area, and were below average in the overall rating. MR 4 battalion staffs were below average in all categories and had the lowest overall rating, but showed improvement in the S2 and S3 areas.

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Chart 20





Chart 21



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### j. Summary of ARVN/VNMC Performance Indicators.

(1) Chart 22 displays the comparative standings of the major ARVN/VNMC organizations according to five selected performance indicators. These five indicators are plotted around the ARVN/VNMC average on a scale determined by the distances by which the various indicators depart from the average. The chart is separated into three zones--above average, average, and below average--for purposes of discussion. Minor variations within each zone are not considered significant, although some major differences can be observed within the above average and below average zones. Also shown in the last column are the 2d Qtr CY 70 ARVN/VNMC indicator averages, which demonstrate the overall change in results achieved this quarter. Organic reconnaissance companies and armored cavalry squadrons are included in division totals, hence many armored cavalry units are included in two organizations--their individual divisions and total cavalry. This duplication was not included in computing the averages, however. The chart does not consider all the ramifications involved in a total evaluation. The organizations are considered in three groups--top, middle, and bottom--in discussing their relationship on the charts.

(2) The top group of ARVN/VNMC organizations during the third quarter contained the 1st, 2d, 7th, and 21st Divisions. The 2d, 7th, and 21st Divisions each had three indicators in the above average zone, while the 1st Division was highest in-country in weapons captured and enemy eliminated. The 7th Division was the only organization in the top group with an indicator in the below average zone. The second quarter ARVN/VNMC average column would also fall into the top group this quarter with two indicators in the above average zone and three in the average zone. The second quarter average "enemy eliminated" was better than any unit's score during the third quarter, and the second quarter average weapons captured was second best. This indicates how much the third quarter operational results regressed from the second quarter results in absolute quantities, but the three second quarter ratios in the average zone indicate that ARVN/VNMC still performed as efficiently this quarter.

(3) The bottom group of ARVN/VNMC organizations during the third quarter contained the 5th and 23d Divisions, and the 51st Regiment. The 51st Regiment had all five indicators in the below average zone and was lowest in-country in enemy eliminated per hour of contact. The 5th Division had four indicators in the below average zone and was lowest in enemy eliminated, weapons captured, and casualty ratio. The 23d Division, with three indicators in the below average zone, was next to the bottom in enemy eliminated, and was only slightly better than the 5th Division and 51st Regiment in weapons captured.

(4) The middle group contained the remaining ARVN/VNMC organizations: The 9th, 18th, 22d, and 25th Divisions, and the airborne, armored cavalry, rangers, and Marines. All second quarter leaders (the 9th and 25th Divisions, the armored cavalry and the Marines) dropped into the middle group this quarter as the opportunities in Cambodia were depleted.



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Chart 22

ARVN/VNMC PERFORMANCE INDICATORS



EN ELIM/BN WPNS CPTR/BN CASUALTY RATIO EN ELIM HR CONTACT WPNS CPTR/EN ELIM

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### k. Evaluation of Operational Performance of Infantry Divisions, Separate Regiments, and Special Organizations.


(1) General. The foregoing evaluations were primarily at corps or country-wide level. In order to provide a more detailed evaluation of the operational performance of ARVN and VMC units, the following pages present charts and texts for each of the divisions, separate regiments, and special organizations (airborne, ranger, armored cavalry, and Marines). Organic reconnaissance company and cavalry squadron results are included in division totals.

(2) Techniques. The evaluations are based primarily on third quarter and yearly trends in operational performance data. For each organization's evaluation, the discussion is organized in terms of environment, effort, combat support, results, operational effectiveness/leadership, and trends. Enemy density is based on the total estimate of maneuver unit strength plus guerrilla strength. In order to compensate for substantial differences in the number of battalions in a division or regiment, equivalent battalion figures are used for some indicators. The total number of equivalent battalions in an organization is obtained by adding together the number of infantry battalions, the armored cavalry squadron equated to a battalion, and the number of reconnaissance companies equated to a quarter battalion each. The number of equivalent battalions in Cambodia is obtained by dividing the number of battalion-days spent in Cambodia by 92, the number of days in the third quarter.




(3) Charts. The evaluation of each organization is illustrated by a chart containing combat support received, opportunity, results, and its operational effectiveness assessment. For those organizations which operated in Cambodia, two bars are used to indicate performance: the wide bars on the left which show overall performance during the entire quarter, with those portions achieved in the Republic and in Cambodia separately identified; the narrow bars on the right indicate the relative efficiency of those units while involved in cross-border operations. An average zone is shown for each measure; variations within this zone are not considered significant and are termed "average." In addition, yearly trends are depicted for enemy eliminated, casualty ratio, advisors' assessments of operational effectiveness and leadership, and percent of effort on all missions.

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Chart 25






TRENDS



OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS LEADERSHIP  
NOTE DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SEER QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY 69

PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



RESERVE TRAINING REHABILITATION

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## 1ST DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density in the 1st Division's TAOR showed a slight increase from second quarter and remained the highest in country at 2.29 per square kilometer. This included the greatest NVA density. Friendly density rose to 6.30 per square kilometer.

Effort. Time spent on combat operations by the 1st Division continued to increase, rising from 79 percent in the second quarter to 81 percent in the third quarter. This was the highest of all ARVN/VNMC organizations. Reserve and rehabilitation time continued low at one percent, with time devoted to training increasing to four percent of the total effort. The 1st Division, like all I Corps units, did not participate in the Cambodian operation.

Combat Support. The division showed a decline this quarter in the use of artillery support, but was still well above the ARVN/VNMC average. Tactical air, which rose from 91 to 128 sorties per battalions, was the highest country-wide. Helicopter lift support fell and was in the average zone.


Results. The 1st Division's hours of contact dropped from 34 hours per battalion last quarter to just under 31 hours per battalion this quarter. With this moderate decline, the division still had the most hours of contact and number of enemy eliminated of all ARVN/VNMC units. The number of weapons captured also declined moderately from 33 to 30 per average battalion; however, this was more than twice the country-wide average, and was highest of all divisional units. A comparison between the number of weapons captured and the number of enemy eliminated shows a 1:3.3 ratio, which was still within the average zone. The casualty ratio shows marked improvement; it rose from 5.7:1 the second quarter to 9:1 this quarter.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The division's operational effectiveness and leadership assessments increased from last quarter to second best in country.


Trends. The 1st Division has shown a continued increase in the time spent on combat operations. This quarter the division led the ARVN/VNMC in time on combat operations, hours of contact, enemy eliminated and weapons captured. The trends in operational effectiveness and leadership increased to second highest in country. The 1st Division should continue to be one of the most effective organizations in ARVN.

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




Chart 21



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS ..... LEADERSHIP  
NOTE: DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SEER QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY 69

RESERVE --- TRAINING ... REHABILITATION

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## 2D DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density per square kilometer in the 2d Division's TAOR continued its downward trend from 1.05 for the second quarter to 1.03 for the third quarter. Friendly density increased during the quarter to 4.80 per square kilometer.

Effort. The division devoted over 65 percent of its time to offensive operations in the third quarter, which was an increase of approximately nine percent over the second quarter. Training time also increased, while time on security declined from 26 to 21 percent. The 2d Division, like all I Corps units, did not operate in Cambodia during the third quarter.

Combat Support. Artillery and tactical air support declined this quarter, but remained within the average zones. Helicopter lift sorties were the only support activity to increase from the second quarter and ranked above the ARVN/VNMC average zone.


Results. The 2d Division's hours of contact dropped from 42 per battalion the second quarter to 23 per battalion the third quarter; however, the division was well above the country-wide average of 15 hours per battalion. The casualty ratio decreased again this quarter, but remained within the average zone. The division was rated second highest in weapons captured this quarter. It achieved excellent results in enemy eliminated and had the highest ratio of weapons captured to weapons lost in country. Also, the division uncovered caches totaling 189 weapons and over 130,000 pounds of food and ammunition, which were highest for the quarter.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The assessment of the division's operational effectiveness improved slightly from the previous quarter, but the leadership assessment fell slightly.




Trends. The number of enemy eliminated by the 2d Division decreased sharply this quarter as did the country-wide average so that the division was well above average in enemy eliminated. The division increased time spent on combat operations but had fewer hours of contact with the enemy. Thus, combat support and operational results were also lower. However, all performance indicators were above or within the ARVN average zones. The 2d Division should continue to be one of the best performers in ARVN.

# CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 25






## TRENDS



NOTE DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED 2-10 QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY68

## PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



RESERVE TRAINING REHABILITATION

# CONFIDENTIAL

## 51ST REGIMENT

Environment. Enemy density decreased slightly this quarter to 1.40 per square kilometer. Friendly density also fell to 4.70 per square kilometer.

Effort. Time spent on offensive operations dropped from 65 percent in the second quarter to approximately 45 percent this quarter. Over 50 percent of the regiment's time was spent providing security for the AN HOA combat base, Route 4 and the Dodge City area in DIEN BAN District, and security of the regimental base area. In essence, two battalions were on combat operations and two battalions were on security missions this quarter. Time devoted to training continued low at 0.4 percent.

Combat Support. All categories of combat support decreased from the previous quarter and were below the ARVN/VNMC average zones.

Results. The number of enemy eliminated dropped from 91 per battalion in the second quarter to 19 this quarter. Weapons captured and casualty ratio also followed the decline, even though the hours of contact increased slightly. All categories of operational results were lower this quarter in comparison to the second quarter and were below the country-wide averages. The senior advisor feels that the low operational results this quarter are due to the high percentage of time the regiment spent on security missions.


Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The assessments of operational effectiveness and leadership dropped slightly this quarter, but continued to be third best in ARVN/VNMC. This indicates that, in the opinion of its advisors, the 51st Regiment has executed the mechanics of warfare well.

Trends. The 51st Regiment's overall results were down in comparison to the second quarter and were below the ARVN average. The regimental desertion rate is one of the highest in country. This regiment may not do better unless there is a change in mission and/or environment.




CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 20




TRENDS



OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS LEADERSHIP  
NOTE DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SEER QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY88

PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



# CONFIDENTIAL

## 22D DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density in the 22d TAOR increased slightly to .52 per square kilometer and was third lowest in the Republic. Friendly density was second lowest in country at 2.40 per square kilometer, but showed an increase this quarter.

Effort. The 22d Division devoted 47 percent of its time to offensive operations. Approximately 27 percent of its total time was spent on security operations. The division's organic cavalry squadron spent virtually all of its time on road security.


Combat Support. There was a decrease in each type of combat support provided, which is a reflection of the substantial decrease in hours of contact. The 22d used the least amount of tactical air and helicopter gunship support in country.

Results. Hours of contact decreased by 50 percent as did weapons captured. Friendly losses decreased by 80 percent from last quarter, while enemy eliminated decreased by 71 percent; this resulted in an increase in the casualty ratio. The weapons captured per enemy eliminated ratio and enemy eliminated per hours of contact were in the average zones.







Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The advisors' assessments of operational effectiveness and leadership increased significantly over last quarter and were in the average zone.

Trends. The number of enemy eliminated decreased sharply due to the general lack of enemy activity. The casualty ratio resumed its uptrend as did the operational effectiveness and leadership ratings. The division continued to be a below average-performer.

Chart 27



### PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS ..... LEADERSHIP  
NOTE DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SEEN QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY00

**RESERVE      TRAINING      REHABILITATION**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

# CONFIDENTIAL

## 23D DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density decreased slightly to .25 per square kilometer. Friendly density increased slightly from last quarter to 1.50 per square kilometer. The 23d Division's TAOR has the largest area and lowest enemy and friendly densities in the Republic.

Effort. The division's time devoted to offensive operations increased but remained below average. Time spent on training increased significantly with a resultant decrease in security missions.

Combat Support. Use of artillery support decreased this quarter while tactical air and helicopter gunship sorties remained approximately the same as last quarter; both were below the ARVN/VNMC average. Helicopter lift support increased, with 30 percent being provided by VNAF, and was in the average zone.


Results. The division's hours of contact decreased by 50 percent from last quarter; operational results also decreased. All results were below average except for the casualty ratio, which was in the average zone. The 23d had the lowest friendly losses in country.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The advisors' assessments of operational effectiveness and leadership increased significantly over last quarter but were still below average.


Trends. The division's erratic enemy eliminated trend line moved downward this quarter. The casualty ratio has been in an uptrend for the last two quarters. After a three quarter downtrend, the operational effectiveness and leadership trend lines moved upward. The 23d Division improved somewhat this quarter, but was still one of ARVN's poorest performers.

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




Chart 28



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS LEADERSHIP  
NOTE DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SEEN QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY 69

# CONFIDENTIAL

## 5TH DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density in the 5th Division's TAOR decreased to .60 per square kilometer. Friendly density decreased to 4.10 per square kilometer, as US units withdrew from border areas.

Effort. Time spent on combat operations by the 5th Division fell from 76 to 72 percent, but was still third highest of all ARVN infantry divisions. No time was devoted to support of pacification, and the 5th did not go into Cambodia during the third quarter.

Combat Support. The 5th Division used less combat support during the third quarter, and was above average in its use of artillery while in the average zones for numbers of tactical air, helicopter gunship, and helicopter lift sorties.


Results. The 5th Division continued to perform below the ARVN/VNMC average. The division was lowest in hours of contact, enemy eliminated, weapons captured, and casualty ratio; it was next to lowest in weapons captured per enemy eliminated. The low casualty ratio again is attributed primarily to a high number of friendly casualties from mines and booby traps; 44 percent of friendly KIA were from these devices, the third highest percentage in ARVN/VNMC.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The 5th Division's operational effectiveness assessment was below average. This indicates the division is not adequately executing the mechanics of combat. The leadership assessment for the third quarter was also poor; the commander of the 9th Regiment and the Assistant Division Commander were replaced during the quarter.


Trends. The 5th Division's performance in terms of enemy eliminated per battalion has been on a downtrend since 3d Qtr CY 69, the only time it exceeded the ARVN/VNMC average. The weapons captured per battalion resumed its downtrend after a slight recovery last quarter. The casualty ratio continued to drop after a strong fourth quarter. The 5th Division is one of ARVN's poorest performers, and any immediate improvement in operational performance remains questionable.

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




Chart 29



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS LEADERSHIP  
NOTE DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SEEN QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY 69

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## 18TH DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density in the 18th Division's TAOR decreased to .42 per square kilometer and was second lowest in country. Friendly density increased to 5.10 per square kilometer, as US units moved into the division's TAOR from the border areas.

Effort. The 18th Division's percent of time on combat operations declined to 68 percent, with no effort being spent in support of pacification. The division continued to devote only a small amount of time to security (12 percent), as the RF/PF performed much of this mission. Elements of the 18th spent a total of 528 battalion-days in Cambodia, second highest of all ARVN/VNMC units; this represented 42 percent of the division's total effort.

Combat Support. All categories of combat support decreased from the second quarter. The bulk of artillery support was used in Cambodia at an above average rate. The division used the second least amount of helicopter lift in ARVN/VNMC.

Results. The number of hours of contact per battalion was less than half of its second quarter amount, and was below the ARVN/VNMC average. The numbers of enemy eliminated and weapons captured also were about one-third of the second quarter results, and were below average. The casualty ratio decreased to 4.8:1 and was also below average. In the past, the 18th Division's casualty ratio had been high because of a small number of friendly losses; this quarter friendly losses were average. However, mines and booby traps only accounted for nine percent of friendly KIA, the second best mark in ARVN/VNMC. In Cambodia, the hours of contact and casualty ratio were lowest of all units employed there, and the number of weapons captured was second lowest. However, most of the overall results achieved by the 18th Division were obtained in Cambodia.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The operational effectiveness assessment of the 18th Division decreased this quarter, but was still in the average zone. The leadership assessment fell even more, and was below average. Commanders have benefited from their Cambodian experiences, however.


Trends. The 18th Division remained below average throughout 1969, and thus far in 1970, in enemy eliminated and weapons captured. The division's casualty ratio fell below average after a year above the average line, as friendly losses increased. The operational effectiveness and leadership assessments regressed this quarter after a three quarter climb. The 18th Division has slipped somewhat in position relative to other ARVN/VNMC units this quarter.

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


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




25TH DIV - 3D QTR CY 70



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



NOTE: DATA FOR THIS REPORT DERIVED FROM REVISIT OF Q. 1. 1969  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR 1969

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## 25TH DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density in the 25th Division's TAOR decreased slightly to 1.72 per square kilometer, third highest in the Republic. Friendly density remained constant at 8.10 per square kilometer.

Effort. The 25th Division's effort was mainly devoted to offensive operations, a category in which it led all ARVN/VNMC organizations. A substantial portion of these operations, moreover, was devoted to active support of pacification. Elements of the 25th spent a total of 548 battalion-days in Cambodia, highest of all ARVN/VNMC organizations. Only one of its infantry battalions failed to see action in Cambodia during the third quarter.

Combat Support. The 25th Division used only one-quarter of the artillery support during the third quarter that it did during the second quarter, and was the lowest user of all ARVN/VNMC organizations. The division used 15 percent less tactical air and helicopter gunship support than last quarter, but was still the second biggest user in ARVN/VNMC. The 25th used more helicopter lift support than in the second quarter, and was well above average. The use of combat support by elements in Cambodia was substantially below the ARVN/VNMC Cambodian averages.


Results. All performance measures were much lower than in the second quarter, and were in or below the average zones. In Cambodia, the 25th Division's measures were better than its overall measures, but were still in or below ARVN/VNMC Cambodian average zones. The division had the second best ratio in country of enemy eliminated per hour of contact.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. Both the operational effectiveness and leadership assessments improved from the second quarter, but remained within the average zones. The division and regimental commanders were rated as the strongest in MR 3.




Trends. The "enemy eliminated" and "weapons captured" trend lines, which had been on up-trends for the past three quarters, turned sharply downward this quarter. The casualty ratio, which had been among ARVN's best during the last three quarters, also fell sharply. The division's effectiveness and leadership evaluations remained high. During the past year, the 25th Division had emerged as one of ARVN's best divisions, but it produced only average results during the third quarter.

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Chart 31






TRENDS



OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS LEADERSHIP  
NOTE DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SEER QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY 69

PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## 7TH DIVISION

Environment. The enemy density, 2.06 per square kilometer, was second highest in the Republic and decreased slightly during the quarter. Friendly density in the division's TAOR was the highest in country at 13.30 per square kilometer.

Effort. The percent of time devoted to offensive operations increased to 57 percent, while security missions climbed to 31 percent of the division's effort. The division operated almost entirely within its TAOR during the third quarter.

Combat Support. The number of artillery rounds fired in support of the division increased by one-third and was highest of all ARVN/VNMC units. The use of helicopter gunships and tactical air support decreased, but was in the average zone. The amount of helicopter lift increased slightly and was greatest in the Republic.


Results. The 7th Division's overall performance indicators were in or above the average zones for the third quarter. This was accomplished with only an average amount of contact, even though the number of hours of contact was only half of the second quarter amount. The number of enemy eliminated decreased slightly from the previous quarter, but was second highest in country. This was accomplished by having the most enemy captured or surrendered of all ARVN/VNMC organizations, a result of the highly successful pacification effort in Kien Hoa Province. The number of weapons captured decreased, but was still in the average zone. However, the ratio of weapons captured per enemy eliminated was lowest in ARVN/VNMC. The 7th Division had the second highest friendly losses to mines and booby traps in country, but the number of friendly losses per battalion was only about a third of the second quarter figure. This almost tripled the division's casualty ratio, which was second best of all ARVN/VNMC organizations. The 7th Division's ratio of enemy eliminated per hour of contact was best in country and its ratio of weapons captured to weapons lost was second best.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The operational effectiveness evaluation of the 7th Division increased slightly during the third quarter and was in the average zone. The division's leadership assessment also increased and was average.


Trends. The numbers of enemy eliminated and weapons captured decreased from the second quarter. The 7th Division's casualty ratio, on an uptrend for the two previous quarters, jumped significantly during the third quarter. The division continued to suffer a high rate of casualties from mines and booby traps. The division's operational effectiveness evaluation has improved in each of the last three quarters, and its leadership assessment for the last two quarters. The 7th Division obtained a position as one of ARVN's best organizations during the third quarter.

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Chart 7




TRENDS



OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS LEADERSHIP  
NOTE DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISOR'S QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY 69

PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



RESERVE TRAINING REHABILITATION

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

### 9TH DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density in the 9th Division's TAOR decreased to .90 per square kilometer. Friendly density increased to 9.20 per square kilometer and was second highest in country.

Effort. Time on offensive operations increased during the quarter to 69 percent. The 9th Division operated throughout the Delta and adjacent areas in Cambodia during the third quarter, spending roughly 29 percent of its effort in its TAOR, 22 percent assisting the 7th Division in the Kien Hoa Province pacification effort, 23 percent in Cambodia, and 22 percent in Chau Doc Province. In the Seven Mountains area it conducted a hard-fought, ground-gaining type campaign to penetrate and control Base Area 400.

Combat Support. The 9th Division reduced its use of all categories of combat support, and was in the average zone for each. The Cambodian combat support rates were even lower, but were also in the average zones.

Results. The 9th Division's hours of contact per battalion decreased considerably, but were still above average. The number of weapons captured and enemy eliminated per battalion also decreased greatly and were in the average zones. The casualty ratio dropped into the average zone, despite the fact that friendly losses were less than half the second quarter amount. All performance indicators were higher in Cambodia than in the Republic, and were at or above the Cambodian averages. The Cambodia hours-of-contact rate was best of all ARVN/VNMC units, while the Cambodian weapons-captured rate was second best.


Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The 9th Division's operational effectiveness and leadership assessments dropped for the third straight quarter. Both assessments were below the average zones.

Trends. The numbers of enemy eliminated and weapons captured and the casualty ratio all decreased sharply, reversing year-long uptrends. The operational effectiveness and leadership evaluations have declined for three straight quarters. The 9th Division ran into heavy going during the third quarter and obtained only average results.


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
Chart 33



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



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## 21ST DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density in the 21st Division's TAOR decreased slightly to .71 per square kilometer. Friendly density increased to 3.60 per square kilometer.

Effort. Time spent on offensive operations decreased by 10 percent from the previous quarter. However, time devoted to active pacification increased to 20 percent, highest in country. The 21st Division also spent the second most time on both static pacification and on reserve and rehabilitation of all ARVN/VNMC units. Each battalion spends one week out of four on stand-down. The division's armored cavalry squadron spent 17 days in Cambodia and 30 days in Chau Doc Province under the control of the 9th Division. Otherwise, the 21st Division operated completely within its TAOR (except for the battalions which underwent refresher training at a National Training Center).

Combat Support. The 21st Division used slightly more artillery and tactical air and helicopter gunship support this last quarter. Its use of helicopter lift support increased significantly and was second highest in ARVN/VNMC. In Cambodia, the division used no helicopter lift support, but its artillery and tactical air and helicopter gunship support rates were highest of all units employed in cross-border operations.

Results. The 21st Division's hours of contact decreased slightly from last quarter, but were second highest in the Republic. The number of enemy eliminated decreased from the second quarter, but was above average since the ARVN/VNMC average decreased even more. The number of weapons captured exhibited a similar pattern, with a decrease from the second quarter but with improvement in relative position compared to other ARVN/VNMC units. The 21st had the second highest number of enemy KIA per battalion in country. The division's casualty ratio increased with a reduction in friendly casualties, and was well above average. Units of the 21st Division in Cambodia were below the ARVN/VNMC Cambodian averages in all results categories except casualty ratio, which was in the average zone.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The operational effectiveness assessment decreased during the quarter and was below the average zone. This indicates that, while the division's operational results are improving, the 21st has an undeveloped potential for doing even better, given better execution of the mechanics of warfare. The leadership assessment improved during the quarter, but was still below average.


Trends. The trend lines of the 21st Division are erratic, crossing and recrossing the ARVN/VNMC average lines. Enemy eliminated and weapons captured decreased slightly this quarter, but at a much slower rate than the average lines. A continued reduction in friendly losses created an improved casualty ratio. The operational effectiveness assessment has been on a three quarter downtrend, while the leadership assessment has been fluctuating for the past year. The 21st Division was one of ARVN/VNMC's best performers this quarter.

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


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Chart 34




TRENDS



OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS ..... LEADERSHIP  
NOTE DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SEER QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY69

PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



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## AIRBORNE DIVISION

Environment. The Airborne Division, consisting of 9 battalions, continued to operate principally in MR 3 this quarter. One brigade operated in Tay Ninh Province and conducted some cross-border operations. Two battalions were in Cambodia during this quarter.

Effort. Time spent on combat operations decreased sharply to 34 percent. This was the least amount of time the airborne has devoted to combat missions during the last 21 months. The division spent 46 percent of its time on training.

Combat Support. All categories of combat support dropped sharply from last quarter which reflected the great reduction in time devoted to combat missions. They used even less support in Cambodia.

Results. All operational results decreased, with the exception of the casualty ratio which increased. All results were in or below the average zones for this quarter. In Cambodia, the airborne performed at a better rate than in country.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The operational effectiveness assessment of airborne units increased after a three quarter downtrend; the leadership assessment dropped this quarter. Both assessments were highest in country.


Trends. After a two quarter uptrend, enemy eliminated dropped to a new low for airborne units. The erratic casualty ratio trend line made a move upward this quarter. Operational effectiveness and leadership had slight changes and were highest in the Republic. The airborne's performance has been erratic and future improvement cannot be predicted.

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Chart 55

**ENEMY ELIM BY AIRBORNE BATTALIONS**




62

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Chart 36

ENEMY ELIM BY  
ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRONS




PREVIOUS QUARTER

63




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Chart 37




TRENDS




OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS AND LEADERSHIP  
NOTE: DATA IN THIS CHART DERIVED FROM A VARIOUS SOURCES AND IS NOT NEARLY AS ACCURATE AS THE DATA IN THE OTHER CHARTS.


PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



COMBAT OPS ACTIVE PAC



SECURITY STATIC PAC



RESERVE TRAINING REHABILITATION

# CONFIDENTIAL

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## ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRONS

Environment. The 17 cavalry squadrons are employed throughout the four military regions; one squadron is organic to each of the 10 divisions, and the remaining seven operate under corps control. Eight squadrons from BRs 3 and 4 spent 395 squadron-days in Cambodia.

Effort. Time spent on combat operations decreased, while time spent on security missions increased. Time devoted to training increased slightly but remained well below average.

Combat Support. All categories of combat support decreased and were in or below average zones. In Cambodia, however, the cavalry used artillery at an above average rate.


Results. Hours of combat dropped sharply but remained in the average zone. Enemy eliminated and weapons captured had a corresponding decline and also remained average. The casualty ratio decreased but remained among the best in country. The cavalry squadrons expended 27 percent of their time in Cambodia this quarter, where they achieved 65 percent of their operational results. All Cambodian results were well above the average rates; they had the best enemy-eliminated rate and second best hours-of-contact rate and casualty ratio there.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The assessment of operational effectiveness and leadership increased slightly this quarter and remained in the average zones.


Trends. Enemy eliminated decreased sharply but did not fall below the 1st Qtr CY 70 level. The casualty ratio continues to be well above average. Operational effectiveness and leadership assessments have been in a steady uptrend for the last three quarters. The cavalry should continue to perform well.

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Chart 38




**TRENDS**



NOTE DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SEER QUESTIONNAIRE EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY69

**PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS**



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## VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS (VMMC)

Environment. During the third quarter, Marine units operated in Cambodia, MR 1, MR 3, and MR 4. They spent 288 battalion-days, 35 percent of their total effort, in Cambodia under OPCON of IV Corps units. One battalion, the 6th, spent the month of September in An Xuyen Province at SOLID ANCHOR. In MR 1 a brigade operated under OPCON of Quang Da Special Zone and the 1st Division for 247 battalion-days, 30 percent of the VMMC total effort. The remainder of the Marines' effort was spent in MR 3.

Effort. Marines continued to spend a high proportion of time (68 percent) on combat operations. They spent more time on reserve and rehabilitation (23 percent) than any other ARVN/VMMC organization.

Combat Support. Marine units reported much less use of combat support this quarter than the previous quarter. These reduced figures may be misleading, however, since battalions operating in Cambodia reported using no combat support. Consequently, the Marines were below the average zones in all support categories.

Results. Hours of contact, enemy eliminated, and weapons captured were all about one-fourth of the second quarter figures, but were still in the average zones. Over half of each of these measures was obtained in Cambodia. The Cambodian rates, however, were also average. The Marines had the second largest number of enemy captured and surrendered in ARVN/VMMC. Their casualty ratio was highest in ARVN/VMMC, both overall and in Cambodia. They suffered the fewest friendly losses to mines and booby traps in the Republic.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. Both the operational effectiveness assessment and leadership assessment took sharp declines from the second quarter, when they were highest in country. During the third quarter, these assessments were in the average zones.


Trends. The Marines' operational results, which had been on a general up-trend since 3d Qtr CY 69, took a sharp downswing during 3d Qtr CY 70 and were average. Their operational effectiveness rating has been on a down-trend since 4th Qtr CY 69. Marine units have achieved results comparable to ARVN's average units.



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Chart 39

# ENEMY ELIM BY MARINE BATTALIONS



▶ PREVIOUS QTR

\* 9 BN ACT 1 JUL 70


68

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CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 40

ENEMY ELIM BY RANGER BATTALIONS




▲ PREVIOUS QUARTER







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Chart 41



## TRENDS



OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS   LEADERSHIP  
NOTE: DATA FOR 1969 AND 1970 IS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING  
PERIOD OF 6 MONTHS

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## RANGERS

Environment. The 20 Ranger battalions are located throughout the four military regions. Ten of these battalions spent a total of 323 battalion-days in Cambodia this quarter.

Effort. Time on combat operations decreased and was below average. Time devoted to security missions remained steady at 27 percent. Training time increased slightly, but was below average this quarter.

Combat Support. Artillery, tactical air, and helicopter gunship support decreased from last quarter but were in the average zone. Helicopter lift support increased by 70 percent over last quarter and was above average. In Cambodia, ranger units used all combat support at higher rates than in the Republic, and all categories were above the average zones.

Results. Hours of contact decreased and were below average. There was a corresponding decrease in operational results, which were all in or below the average zones. Fifty-seven percent of the enemy eliminated and 75 percent of weapons captured were accounted for in Cambodia. Thirty-five percent of ranger losses this quarter were due to mines and booby traps.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The operational effectiveness assessment decreased slightly this quarter while the leadership assessment increased. Both ratings were below average.

Trends. After a three quarter uptrend, enemy eliminated dropped sharply this quarter to a level below that of 1st Qtr CY 70. The casualty ratio, which has been erratic, took a sharp drop this quarter. Operational effectiveness and leadership ratings have also been erratic and show no definite trends. Considering the large amount of time devoted to security missions, the ranger units did relatively well this quarter.


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## 4. (C-NOFORN) ARVN/VNMC Problem Areas.

a. General. Major objectives of SEER are to identify weaknesses and problem areas which reduce combat effectiveness and, through analytical methods, determine courses of action by which RVNAF, with MACV assistance, may increase the effectiveness of their forces. This section contains major problem areas reported by senior advisors to ARVN units, and MACV staff actions taken to assist in resolving the problems. In addition, this section contains major problems highlighted in the MACV analysis of ARVN/VNMC organizations.


b. Infantry Battalion Strength. Overall ARVN/VNMC strength decreased by approximately 5,000 during the third quarter to 426,000, approximately 21,000 below the authorized level (Chart 42). Personnel in the pipeline decreased by ten percent to 91,000, with over 45,000 in training and schools. The large number in the pipeline continued to limit the personnel available in combat organizations. Chart 43 shows the authorized and average assigned strength of ARVN infantry battalions by division. The total assigned strength of ARVN infantry battalions decreased by 2,000 during the third quarter, and was 26 percent below authorized levels. The 9th and 21st Divisions had the lowest assigned strengths, with shortfalls of 37 percent, while the 25th Division was highest with a shortfall of 17 percent. Shortages were approximately 10 percent in late 1968 and first quarter 1969.

Chart 42



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
Chart 43



## c. Casualties Due to Mines and Booby Traps.

(1) Mine and booby trap casualties continued to be a serious problem in ARVN/VNMC. In the third quarter, deaths from mines and booby traps decreased but, since total friendly KIA dropped sharply, the percent of total casualties due to these devices doubled. Chart 44 depicts the magnitude of the problem during the last seven quarters.


Chart 44



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(2) Chart 45 presents data on this problem for each major organization. The problem has been more acute for MR 1 and MR 4 units, but MR 1 had 30 fewer deaths from mines and booby traps than last quarter, and MR 4, although recording an increase of six from second quarter, had only half as many friendly KIA from these devices as in the first quarter. A high percentage of friendly KIA from mines and booby traps was recorded by the 51st Regiment, the 5th and 7th Divisions, and the rangers.

Chart 45



▼ PREVIOUS QTR AVG

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### d. Battalion Problem Areas.

(1) During the third quarter, advisors to the ARVN/VNMC maneuver battalions and armored cavalry squadrons submitted responses to questions contained in the MACV SEER Questionnaire which indicated potential problem areas. Chart 46 depicts the percent of advisors that indicated their units performed inadequately in selected areas. The percentages are based on the frequency of responses from approximately 370 questionnaires. SEER problem area evaluations include only battalions, since the areas of concern are based on problems which exist primarily at that level. Certain problems show noticeable differences between ARVN infantry battalions and special units (airborne, cavalry, Marines, and rangers) and, while not indicated on the chart, these are noted in the comments below. The problem areas in the order they appear on Chart 46 are as follows:

(2) Inadequate Dependent Housing. Dependent housing has been a continual concern of ARVN, and major efforts to improve its quantity and quality are being made. Conditions have improved steadily from the fourth quarter 1969, but 66 percent of advisors still considered the amount of housing to be inadequate, and 52 percent reported the quality as inadequate. Special units reported slightly less problems in dependent housing than ARVN infantry battalions.

(3) Reinforcement. Twenty-five percent of the advisors reported that their units failed to reinforce elements in contact with adequate speed and with sufficient strength half of the time or more, a regression from the previous quarter. The problem was not as serious in special units as in ARVN infantry battalions.

(4) Intelligence. The intelligence function in ARVN battalions has presented major problems as indicated by the responses concerning timeliness, collection efforts and security leaks. Fifty-four percent of advisors reported that the intelligence received by the unit was untimely 50 percent or more of the time during the third quarter. Efforts to collect intelligence were judged inadequate in 12 percent of the units; the special unit percentage was greater than that of ARVN infantry. While not displayed on the chart, it was noted that advisors reported most units as reacting appropriately to available intelligence most of the time, with 20 percent reporting it as a problem. There was reason to believe that the enemy was sometimes forewarned of the unit's combat operations by security leaks. Approximately 32 percent of the advisors reported this area as a problem, with the percentage in ARVN infantry organizations being less than that of special units.


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Chart 46-1


## BATTALION PROBLEM AREAS PERCENT OF ADVISORS REPORTING PROBLEMS



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Chart 46-11

## BATTALION PROBLEM AREAS PERCENT OF ADVISORS REPORTING PROBLEMS



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(5) Leadership. Eleven percent of the advisors reported that NCO leadership capability was a problem. Company grade officer leadership ability was also reported as inadequate by three percent of the advisors during the third quarter. The leadership problem was greater in ARVN infantry battalions than in special units.

(6) Desertions. Desertions are a continuing problem in ARVN, and have been receiving command emphasis. However, unit commanders' actions designed to cope with the desertion problem were reported to be inadequate in eight percent of the ARVN maneuver battalions, an improvement from the previous quarter. The problem was not as great in special units.

(7) Aggressiveness. Ten percent of the advisors reported that units fought aggressively one half of the time or less which was an improvement from the previous quarter. This problem was greater in ARVN infantry battalions than in special units.

(8) Indecisive Actions. Some unit commanders failed to take decisive action when the opportunity arose. Approximately 13 percent of the advisors reported this occurred 50 percent or more of the time in the third quarter, with the problem being slightly greater in ARVN infantry battalions than in special units.

(9) Repair Parts Availability. The availability of repair parts was reported to be inadequate in a large number of units. This problem was particularly serious in artillery battalions and armored cavalry squadrons, where some mission essential equipment was deadlined for lack of repair parts. Advisors reported that the supply system has been distorted by failure of units to properly requisition items. In those portions of Chart 46 dealing with repair parts unavailability and untimely requisitions, artillery units have been added and cavalry squadrons portrayed separately from other maneuver battalions to emphasize the seriousness of this problem in those units. For all three types of units, the availability of repair parts improved this quarter while requisitions were more untimely.

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### e. Staff Problem Areas.

(1) Chart 47 covers selected staff functions reported as inadequate in the SEER questionnaire by advisors to ARVN/VNMC organizations. The problem area functions are grouped separately by maneuver battalion staffs, and by regiment, group, brigade and division staffs, since battalions usually have experienced greater difficulty in staff operations than higher units. While the analysis includes all staff functions for completeness, the G1/S1 and most of the G4/S4 functions appear to be operating effectively due to the low number of advisors reporting these as problems.

(2) G1/S1 Functions. The personnel and morale functions of higher staffs have shown some improvement during the last quarter, with a slight regression being reported for battalion staffs. The chart presents percentages of inadequate ratings for the G1/S1 section in the following categories:

(a) Maintains organization strength, keeps records, and arranges for replacements.

(b) Supervises personnel management by classifying, assigning, promoting and transferring troops.

(c) Develops and maintains morale through personnel services, decorations and awards, and graves registration.

(3) G2/S2 Functions. The intelligence functions for all staffs have shown little improvement since the fourth quarter. The chart presents percentages of inadequate ratings of the G2/S2 section in the following categories:

(a) Supervises, coordinates, and plans intelligence collection activities.

(b) Processes intelligence information through recording, evaluation, and interpretation, and disseminates intelligence.

(c) Plans and supervises counterintelligence activities.


(4) G3/S3 Functions. The operations and training functions have shown erratic behavior since the fourth quarter, particularly in the area of training programs. The chart presents percentages of inadequate ratings of the G3/S3 section in the following categories:

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(Part 17-1)

## G1/S1 AND G2/S2 STAFF FUNCTION PROBLEM AREAS PERCENT OF ADVISORS REPORTING PROBLEMS




.....MANEUVER BATTALION STAFFS — REGIMENT/GROUP/BRIGADE/DIVISION STAFFS

# CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 47-11

## G3/S3 AND G4/S4 STAFF PROBLEM AREAS PERCENT OF ADVISORS REPORTING PROBLEMS



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(a) Analyzes missions, recommends priorities for utilization of manpower and equipment, and recommends requirements for tables of equipment and organization.

(b) Analyzes the training situation and proposes and implements training programs.

(c) Analyzes the tactical situation, develops courses of action, and makes recommendations to the commander for operations.

(5) G4/S4 Functions. The logistics functions show little improvement since the fourth quarter, with both staffs improving in maintenance. The chart presents percentages of inadequate ratings of the G4/S4 section in the following categories:

(a) Determines requirements for, procures, stores and allocates supplies.

(b) Makes provision for adequate medical support.

(c) Formulates, coordinates and supervises maintenance and repair programs.


f. Training Assessment. Training programs continue to receive emphasis in developing ARVN/VNMC effectiveness. To provide more depth, the revised SEER questionnaire has expanded the coverage of the training function, and this additional information is provided in this evaluation.

(1) Training Effectiveness. The 3d Qtr CY 70 training effectiveness evaluations presented in Chart 48 are based on advisors' responses to 16 different questions on frequency of training programs, results from training programs, and the manner in which training programs are conducted. MR 2 organizations displayed an overall improvement from the previous quarter, and were above the ARVN infantry average. MR 4 showed no change from the second quarter and remained below average, due primarily to the assessments of the 9th and 21st Divisions. MR 1, MR 3 and all special units regressed this quarter, so that the overall ARVN/VNMC assessment was lower than for the second quarter.

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Chart 48



▼ PREVIOUS QUARTER



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(2) Training at Division Training Schools and National Training Centers (Chart 49). The quality of training at division training schools and National Training Centers deteriorated markedly. Advisors reported regression since the previous quarter, and 18 percent rate such training to be in the "poor" category.

(3) Training to Reduce Casualties (Chart 49). Training to reduce casualties has been separated into two categories: mine and booby trap casualties, and casualties from other causes. The number of advisors reporting the quality of training to reduce mine and booby trap casualties as "poor" increased to 25 percent. Reports rating the training to reduce other casualties as "poor" increased to 27 percent. Both categories, moreover, showed a significant decrease in the amount of "good" quality training.

(4) Training of Officers and NCOs (Chart 49). The evaluation of the quality of training received by company grade officers and unit NCOs regressed this quarter. The number of advisors reporting "poor" quality training increased to 23 percent for officer training and 30 percent for NCO training. The quantity of in-place leadership and responsibility training received by company grade officers and unit NCOs increased from the second quarter.

(5) Training to Improve Combat Skills (Chart 49). The quality of training to improve combat skills has regressed slightly from the second quarter, but the quantity of such training has increased substantially. During the third quarter there was an increase from 21 to 22 percent of the advisors who reported this training to be "poor", and a reduction from 50 to 48 percent who stated their units conducted such training for 30 hours or less during the entire quarter.


(6) Marksmanship Training (Chart 49). As in other training areas, the quality of marksmanship training declined this quarter, and 25 percent of the advisors rated the training as "poor". The amount of marksmanship training increased since the previous quarter. The number of units receiving no marksmanship training increased from 12 to 16 percent.

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
Chart 49

## ADVISORS' ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING


### QUALITY OF TRAINING:



### COMPANY GRADE OFFICER & UNIT NCO TRAINING



### TRAINING TO IMPROVE:




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## (7) Time Spent on Training By ARVN Infantry Battalions.

(a) Training Time. Time spent by ARVN organizations on training increased to its highest level in the last two years as units stood down from the extensive combat operations of the second quarter. This category reflects total time devoted by battalions to training and provides for combining the time spent by smaller units into battalion-days. Time spent on major training programs, such as national and division level training, is also included. Chart 50 reflects an increase in total time spent on training, a reversal of the 1970 unfavorable trend. There was, however, considerable variation in the time reported by each organization, with less than one percent reported by the 51st Regiment and over 46 percent by the Airborne Division.

(b) Refresher Training. Training programs for the maintenance of unit combat proficiency are conducted at training centers as unit refresher training (a four week course for infantry battalions), or as command supervised in-place training. Each unit is required to complete refresher training once every three years. Chart 51 shows the percent of ARVN infantry battalions and special units which have either completed battalion refresher training since 1967 or are scheduled to receive it in 1970. The 1st Division is the only organization having its battalion training completed for the three year period. An accelerated program to provide refresher training was planned for 1970, but increased combat activity caused cancellation of approximately half of this training.

Chart 50




FIGURES INDICATE PERCENT OF TIME DEVOTED TO TRAINING

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
Chart 51

## ARVN/VNMC REFRESHER TRAINING

### ARVN INFANTRY BATTALION



### SPECIAL UNITS



COMPLETED
 SCHEDULED-1970
 OVERDUE

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g. Action on Third Quarter Problem Areas. Problems noted below were reported during the third quarter to MACV staff agencies. Actions taken to resolve these problems are indicated.

(1) Problem. The Quang Da Special Zone warrants the assignment of a Military Intelligence Detachment (MID).

Comment. This problem has been staffed through J2 and J3, JGS, and the need for the MID was concurred in by J2, MACV, on 27 October 1970.

(2) Problem. Ineffective mechanical ambushes. A principal reason is the fear of accidental detonation during emplacement or recovery, due to the makeshift nature of the device.

Comment. Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) initiated a Vietnam Laboratory Assistance Program, Army (VLAPA) request on 14 September 1970, to develop a triggering device for mechanical ambushes. This device should be available for field use in approximately four months.

(3) Problem. As II Corps continued self-supported Cambodian operations, insufficient VNAF helicopter support remained a serious problem.

Comment. A staff study concerning this problem has recently been completed and forwarded to the Senior Advisor, MR 3. In addition, this problem was discussed by General Vien and Lieutenant General Tri during the Third Quarter Review on 6 November 1970.

(4) Problem. Shortage of AN/PRC-25 radios.

Comment. The total prime and substitute ARVN assets exceed both current and proposed base line quantities. RVNAF is being encouraged to redistribute AN/PRC-25 and AN/PRC-10 radios to meet operational requirements.

(5) Problem. Shortage of Handsets (H-189) for the AN/PRC-25 and AN/PRC-10 radios.

Comment. Currently there is a country-wide shortage of 3,226 handsets (H-189). Shipments from CONUS depots to RVN began arriving in September. A total of 3,077 have been shipped from CONUS through the end of October.

(6) Problem. Shortage of antenna (AT-271) for the AN/PRC-25 and AN/PRC-10 radios.

Comment. On 11 November, 1,500 antennas were received at the 60th Supply Base Depot. This will meet the current total due-out requirement.

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(7) Problem. Shortage of 12 channel carrier equipment.

Comment. Of the two types of 12 channel equipment authorized within ARVN, there are a total of 196 items on hand and 146 due-in. ARVN is authorized 26 AN/TCC-7s and 360 AN/TCC-50s. All AN/TCC-7s and 170 AN/TCC-50s, plus 53 substitutes, are on hand with 146 AN/TCC-50s due-in. Prior to the end of 4th Qtr CY 70, 20 will be received. MR 2 has reported 12 AN/TCC-50s excess and the ARVN Signal Department has been requested to initiate redistribution action based on operational priorities.

(8) Problem. Shortage of Radio Set KWM-2 and associated crystal sets and accessories.

Comment. MR 1 currently has 40 percent of its authorized quantity against a country-wide 51 percent of authorization on hand. Receipt of 246 radio sets KWM-2 scheduled for early CY 71 will bring ARVN to 92 percent of current authorization. This item is on the Keystone ARVN Want List and additional sets may be available through this source. Regarding the associated crystal set (CK-31), USAECOM no longer procures and stocks the kit as a complete item. Users must requisition individual crystals based on specific frequency requirements. ARVN Signal Department has been requested to survey needs for individual crystals required for operating frequencies, to provide data for expediting supply action.

(9) Problem. Shortage of barrier materials in MR 1.

Comment. An adequate supply of barrier materials is available within the RVNAF. JGS Central Logistics Command has been encouraged to relocate/redistribute barrier materials within RVN and to issue from the emergency reserve stocks at the 40th Supply Base Depot to meet urgent requirements in MR 1. Funds for barrier materials are programmed 2 years in advance of use, based on issue experience. This issue experience data is reduced when allocated materials are not picked up from depots by units. This is true in MR 1.

(10) Problem. Shortage of obturator spindles and obturator parts for 155 howitzers.

Comment. The 20th Ordnance Supply Base Depot issued 114 spindles on 2 November 1970 with 20 being issued to MR 1. The next shipment from CONUS is expected in late January 1971. All repair parts except bushings are on hand. The bushing can be fabricated from copper bar stock, FSN 9530-167-1978, which is available through engineer supply channels. To preclude failures, using units should insure correct adjustment of head-space.

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(11) Problem. Shortage of cargo slings and nets for aerial delivery.

Comment. Cargo sling authorizations have recently been changed from a fixed TOE to a usage based system. This will permit stockage of demand base quantities at the field depots and the 90th Aerial Equipment Depot. Currently ARVN is authorized 482 cargo nets and has 320 on hand with 162 being placed on requisition during November 1970. Cargo nets, because of their high dollar value, will continue to be authorized on a TOE basis.

(12) Problem. Division artillery vehicles (5 ton and 2 1/2 ton) are currently approaching the end of their useful life. Although a large number of vehicles are not technically deadlined, they are unable to develop the pulling power to tow organic howitzers.

Comment. A modernization program for 2 1/2 ton vehicles has been approved by DA and assets have been programmed. All vehicles procured from Japan are scheduled to be replaced by the end of FY 71. M602 trucks will be replaced through normal attrition. The 5 ton vehicles, which are standard M series US vehicles, are also replaced on a one for one basis as they are washed out of the system. Technical inspections should be requested from support maintenance for vehicles which cannot properly perform their intended missions.

(13) Problem. Lack of authorization for replacement generators as unauthorized generators become unserviceable.

Comment. The proposed table of allowance for the additional generators in MR 1 was received by the Office of the Chief Engineer in October 1970, and forwarded to JGS for staffing. Expected completion date for staffing and approval is February 1971.

(14) Problem. Shortage of 5 ton dump trucks as replacements for the 2 1/2 ton dump trucks.

Comment. ARVN currently has 97 percent of the total number of 5 and 2 1/2 ton dump trucks authorized. Replacement of 587 OSPJ 2 1/2 ton dump trucks with M51A2 5 ton dump trucks is included in modernization plans for FY 71. The remainder (273) will be replaced by the end of FY 73. The M614 2 1/2 ton dump trucks will be replaced through normal attrition with a projected residue of 356 on hand at the end of FY 76.

(15) Problem. Shortage of 286 Automotive Mechanics Tool Sets, MR 1.

Comment. Currently there are 8,755 tool kits authorized country-wide and 8,750 on hand. Appropriate distribution is being made based on current priorities.

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(16) Problem. Shortage of M-1 aiming circles.

Comment. Based on current authorizations, equipment status reports show an excess of M-1 aiming circles within ARVN. The distribution problem has been called to the attention of the Office of the Chief of Ordnance. ARVN has been requested to inventory the subject item to confirm quantities on hand. If Department of the Army approves a proposed additional authorization, programming of additional quantities will be accomplished during November.

(17) Problem. Shortage of Radio Sets AN/VRC-47 in the 23d Division Artillery.

Comment. On hand quantities of Radio Set AN/VRC-47, and substitutes, exceed the TOE authorization and the DA baseline. Any additional ARVN receipts of Radio Sets AN/VRC-47 will come from in-country assets made available as a result of redeployment of US units.

(18) Problem. Shortage of Radio Sets AN/VRC-49 in the 23d Division Artillery.

Comment. ARVN-wide authorization for this item is 103. Currently, 116 AN/VRC-49 and an additional 146 substitutes are on hand. ARVN Signal Department records reflect an authorized quantity of 16 AN/VRC-49 in MR 2, and an on hand quantity of 18. Redistribution of assets within MR 2 should eliminate 23d Division Artillery shortfall.

(19) Problem. Shortage of individual clothing.

Comment. Current supplies of clothing throughout the country are adequate. Large shipments have been made to all areas and it is expected that dues-out in MR 2 will be satisfied during November. The RVNAF clothing production activities are currently producing over 350,000 sets of uniforms per month. Jungle shoes continue to be critical country-wide. US advisors have recommended to the Office of the Chief Quartermaster that first priority be given to filling initial issue requirements. Sufficient quantities of all sizes are scheduled for receipt during November to satisfy initial dues-out. Expected shipments due-in during December 1970, and January 1971, are sufficient to satisfy all current dues-out.

(20) Problem. Shortage of Radio Sets AN/TRC-35 and AN/TRC-36.

Comment. ARVN-wide authorization of AN/TRC-35 radios is 361. There are a total of 203 AN/TRC-35 radios and 99 substitute items presently on hand with 59 due-in. Forecasted dates of arrival are presently not available. However, it is expected that shortfall quantities will become available prior to the close of FY 71, either through shipment from CONUS or KEYSTONE transfers. Present ARVN-wide on-hand quantities of AN/TRC-36 radios exceed the DA baseline for this item. Of 127 AN/TRC-36 radios authorized, ARVN currently has 120 on-hand plus 6 substitutes and 1 due-in.

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Requirements in MR 4 should be met by redistribution of in-country assets.

(21) Problem. Shortage of Radio Sets AN/GRC-122.

Comment. There is an ARVN-wide authorization for 112 Radio Sets AN/GRC-122 with 45 percent of authorization on-hand. MR 4 has 27 percent of its authorized quantity of this item on-hand. This indicates possible requirement for redistribution of available assets to increase the on-hand percentage in MR 4, in keeping with operational priorities. Fifty-eight AN/GRC-122 radios are due-in to ARVN prior to the close of FY 71. Current on-hand quantities plus due-ins exceed the current DA baseline.

(22) Problem. Shortage of Radio Sets KWM-2.

Comment. Current authorization, ARVN-wide, for this item is 597. Three hundred (51 percent) are presently on-hand. MR 4 currently has 28 percent of its authorization for this item, indicating possible requirement for redistribution of assets to MR 4, if operational requirements dictate. Delivery of the 246 radios due-in is expected prior to the close of 3d quarter FY 71. These receipts, plus quantities on-hand, will bring ARVN to 92 percent of the current authorization.

(23) Problem. Shortage of repair parts and batteries for vehicles.

Comment. Repair parts for the vehicle repair program in Military Region 4 are being specially managed by the Office of the Chief of Ordnance. Demands are being filled by the 20th Ordnance Supply Base Depot.

(24) Problem. Desertions are excessive in all MRs.

Comment. (a) During the 3d Quarter, CY 70, RVNAF losses through desertions were 41,410. Desertions continue to be a major problem and represent the largest single manpower loss sustained by RVNAF. Numerous studies have been conducted by JGS and MACV to determine the basic causes of desertions. An analysis of these studies reveals a primary cause to be a failure on the part of some leaders to understand and exercise the responsibilities of command. Additional causes are personal factors such as a lack of individual motivation, homesickness, concern for family welfare, and a fear of hardship and danger.

Comment. (b) JGS and subordinate commanders recognize the impact of personnel turbulence caused by desertions and have instituted measures to correct the deficiency. Desertion control committees at various levels of command meet periodically to examine the trends, determine causes and recommend solutions. At the national level, actions have been taken to improve the morale and welfare of the individual soldier and thus decrease desertions. Recent actions include:

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1 A pay raise effective in October 1970.

2 Special promotion boards convened in October to consider sector and sub-sector commanders for promotion; special promotions are now being considered for battalion and lower unit commanders.

3 Provision of additional transportation for personnel on leave.

4 Revised procedures to allot pay to family members.

5 Increased emphasis on construction of dependent shelters.

6 A study presently underway to improve mail procedures.

7 Increased veterans compensation.

Comment. (c) During the latter part of 1969, an in-depth study was made of RVNAF Personnel Systems by a combined JGS/MACV committee. Areas investigated included programming, procurement, training, distribution, personnel management and services, separations and veterans affairs, and reporting. Many problems were identified in these areas and solutions were proposed. Implementation of recommendations started in the spring of 1970 and has progressed satisfactorily. As improvements are made which affect the morale and welfare of the individual soldier, there should be a decrease in the RVNAF desertion rate.

Comment. (d) The number of deserters from RVNAF should be reduced when two related actions are fully implemented.

1 A MACV proposed study of manpower management in the Republic of Vietnam provides for the consideration of an immediate institution of a system for selective release from RVNAF and a return to terms of service. In addition to reducing desertions, other accruing benefits are: improving morale; inspiring more volunteering; and providing a source of trained manpower for the civil economy as well as for the Regional and Popular Forces. The offices of the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense are presently considering ways in which to implement this proposal.

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2 The Director of Mobilization has recently concluded a series of seminars (one in each Military Region) to consider ways to improve the national mobilization system. A problem that was surfaced in each of these seminars was the lack of cooperation from the village/hamlet officials. It appears that many of these officials are resorting to aiding and abetting draft dodgers and deserters in order to protect their manpower resources. This attitude is attributed to the keen competition between the manpower needs for RVNAF and the needs for manpower in the local defense and development of the village/hamlet. The Director of Mobilization is presently considering a plan to consolidate manpower management, conscription and recruiting efforts at province level. This consolidation of efforts should improve relations between the local officials and national agencies by ensuring a more equitable distribution of manpower resources.

Comment. (e) JGS desertion control measures are sound. Strict enforcement of existing measures, completion of the National Identity Registration Program, and increased cooperation among military, police and local officials are needed to decrease the desertion rate and improve overall efficiency and effectiveness.

Comment. (f) MACV will continue to support the JGS desertion control efforts by assisting in reducing the basic causes in every way possible.

(25) Problem. There is a shortage of personnel and replacements in all MRS.

Comment. (a) Recruiting and conscription requirements were not met for the quarter, although adequate manpower resources are available. The RVNAF recruiting and induction system had been successful in meeting its quotas in the first half of CY 70. However, during the third quarter, quotas have not been met due to the following:

1 Keen competition between the manpower needs for RVNAF versus paramilitary and community development program needs.

2 An inadequate conscription registration and control system, coupled with abuse of deferments.

3 Inability of National Police to effectively round up draft dodgers.

4 Lack of cooperation from district, village and hamlet officials.

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Comment. (b) The Director of Mobilization has recently conducted a series of seminars in each of the military regions to discuss these problems. Initial indications are that the problems have been adequately identified and solutions proffered. A revision of the mobilization system for the CY 71 procurement efforts should result in meeting manpower requirements.

Comment. (c) J1/JGS reports the following percent of assigned versus authorized infantry strength by Corps.

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>31 Oct 70</u>	<u>PROJECTED</u> <u>31 Dec 70</u>
I Corps	80%	79%
II Corps	76%	78%
III Corps	87%	86%
IV Corps	80%	77%

Comment. (d) Better conscription and recruiting procedures, coupled with decreasing nonbattle losses are essential to increase the strength of the combat units. Significant improvement is not anticipated prior to CY 71.

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### 5. (C-NOFORN) Vietnamese Naval Forces Evaluation.

#### a. Introduction.

(1) This report addresses the operational effectiveness of the Vietnamese Navy (VNN). The report is based on the Naval Forces Evaluation System (NFES), a subsystem of SEER.

(2) In measuring the operational effectiveness of the VNN there are three major areas of interest:

(a) Improvement and Modernization.

(b) Operational Performance.

(c) Operational Results.

(3) Although unquantifiable results frequently overshadow the quantifiable ones, a general feel for the situation can be obtained by examining the factors that make up these areas.

(4) A glossary of acronyms is included at the end of the section.

(5) In the interest of deleting non-essential reports and functions, continued publication of this section of SEER is currently under study.

#### b. Summary of Performance.

##### (1) Effectiveness.

(a) Craft turnovers are on schedule.

(b) Supply center performance is satisfactory.

(c) The VNN measure of effort (craft employment) was satisfactory during the quarter.

(d) The level of enemy activity on the MR 3 and MR 4 waterways remained light and results against the enemy were about the same as last quarter; however, VNN personnel casualties were the highest experienced during the past seven quarters and the number of craft destroyed or damaged was greater than that reported for the previous quarters of CY 70. These casualties resulted primarily from mine and rocket attacks against the VNN units.

(e) The VNN assumed command of operation Barrier Reef during the quarter and operation Ready Deck is a VNN operation with no USN forces assigned except advisory personnel. Five of the major operations are commanded by VNN officers and all operations are scheduled to be under VNN command by February 1971.

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## (2) Problem Areas.

(a) Forces are short officers and petty officers because of the rapid expansion of the VNN. Ninety percent of the officer strength is programmed to be attained by May 1972 and 90 percent of the petty officer strength is scheduled to be attained by November 1971.

(b) Civilian repair facilities and shipyard strengths remain below a satisfactory level. In June the VNN was allowed to resume hiring civilian personnel to fill the authorized vacancies. However, a shortage of skilled personnel may result in augmentation of the repair facilities and shipyard with military personnel.

## c. Improvement and Modernization.

(1) Improvement and Modernization will be measured by examining:

- (a) Craft Inventories.
- (b) Personnel Strengths.
- (c) Training.
- (d) Logistics.

## (2) Craft Inventories.

(a) Actual and planned VNN combat and logistics lift craft are shown in Table 2. Craft assets are made available to the VNN through Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) deliveries and turnover of in-country USN assets. The craft turnover is on schedule.

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TABLE 2  
ACTUAL AND PLANNED VNN CRAFT INVENTORIES

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>END OF CY 69</u>	<u>ON HAND 30 SEP 70</u>	<u>PROGRAMMED CY 70</u>	<u>ULTIMATE</u>
Coastal Surveillance				
PC, PCE, PGM, MSC	30	32	32	32
PCF, WPB	41	103	126	133
JUNKS	226	228	228	228
DER/WHEC	0	0	0	4
River Security/Interdiction				
PBR	88	250	293	293
MLMS/LMM	16	16	16	16
LSSL/LSIL	11	11	11	11
Escort Craft	28	28	28	28
River Assault/Interdiction				
RAG Craft	202	202	202	202
RAID Craft	108	184	222	225
Logistic Lift				
LST, LSM, LCU, YOG, AKL	<u>20</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>33</u>
Total Craft	770	1081	1187	1205

(b) Chart 52 shows the cumulative craft turnovers to the VNN since 1 January 1969. During the third quarter, 12 coastal surveillance craft were added to the VNN inventory, bringing the cumulative craft turnovers to 514 since January 1969.


(3) Personnel Strength. Chart 53 shows the VNN personnel strength expansion from first quarter 1969. The personnel strength is 39,136 and is composed of 3,169 officers, 6,769 petty officers and 29,198 enlisted men. The number of personnel in the pipeline (11,914) is still high due primarily to personnel in training. The VNN has completed its major recruiting effort and has attained its authorized strength.

(a) Ship, craft, and support activity personnel manning levels are displayed in Table 3 as percentages of TOE allowances.

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Chart 52


USN CRAFT TURNED OVER TO VNN  
(CUMULATIVE SINCE JAN. 1969)



➤ TURNOVER GOAL

Chart 53

VNN PERSONNEL ASSIGNED



PIPELINE

OTHER

--- AUTHORIZED



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TABLE 3  
PERSONNEL MANNING LEVELS

<u>CATEGORY</u>	AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 70
Coastal Surveillance	
Officer	60%
PO	37%
Enlisted	97%
TOTAL	71%
River Security/Interdiction	
Officer	44%
PO	33%
Enlisted	127%
TOTAL	83%
River Assault/Interdiction	
Officer	59%
PO	30%
Enlisted	102%
TOTAL	72%
Logistic Lift	
Officer	94%
PO	49%
Enlisted	123%
TOTAL	92%
Pipeline, Training Facilities & Support Activities	
Officer	53%
PO	66%
Enlisted	245%
TOTAL	146%
Civilian Repair	55%

(b) All categories are short of officers and petty officers. The FY 71 authorized strength of 39,611 requires approximately 6,000 officers. Ninety percent of this requirement is projected to be attained by May 1972. The most severe management problem in the VNN is the shortage of qualified petty officers. For the FY 71 strength, 13,000 petty officers are required. Ninety percent of required petty officer strength is expected to be attained by November 1971.

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(c) Civilian Repair Facility and shipyard strengths remain below a satisfactory level. The shipyard civilian personnel allowance was increased to 3,110 during early 1970 and the Minister of Defense approved a wage increase to stimulate recruiting of the additional personnel. During the period March-June 1970, the Vietnamese government froze the shipyard civilian manning level at 2,205 personnel. The hiring restriction was removed in early June, but there are few skilled workers available to fill the jobs. Should the shortage continue, the shipyard work force will require augmentation by military personnel.

(4) Training. Training programs to support asset turnover and to upgrade the competence level of the VNN fell short of their goals during the third quarter. Cumulative inputs to the training programs, as percentages of the number of personnel programmed to start training, are shown in Table 4.

TABLE 4

TRAINING

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>30 SEP CUMULATIVE CY 70 INPUTS</u>
Recruit	63%
Basic Specialist	92%
Advanced Specialist	122%
Petty Officer	80%
Midshipman	89%
Warrant Officer	111%
English Language	91%
Boat School	46%
On-the-job Training, Crew	76%
On-the-job Training, Other than Crew	75%
Off-Shore (Outside the country)	98%

(a) The recruit training shortfall of 37 percent for the 3d Quarter CY 70 is mainly the result of a shortfall of 1,000 recruits below the programmed training schedule in August and 200 in September. Since recruiting to the approved force level ceiling of 39,611 was completed on 30 June 1970, this shortfall in training is not considered to be a problem.

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(b) The petty officer school continues to suffer from a lack of inputs. Of the 980 programmed for the quarter, 161 were filled for a shortfall of 819. The shortfall was greatest in August when 161 of 620 quotas were filled. Inputs to the petty officer school are low because personnel from the operating forces must be nominated by their commanding officers for this school. Commanding officers are reluctant to nominate personnel, since loss of these personnel further reduces their low total manning levels.


(c) In the English Language School, 125 percent (312 persons) input was realized for the 3d Quarter CY 70. The English Language School programmed monthly input has been changed to 100 vice 150. Actual inputs have not been adjusted to programmed inputs.

(d) Boat School has recovered markedly from the shortage of students caused by the recruiting problem in the first quarter of the year. The shortfall of eight percent for the quarter was due primarily to the late start in training of 70 personnel during July 1970.

(e) The shortfall of 18 percent of 215 people in OJT, crew, was due primarily to the insufficient numbers of enlisted personnel available to meet the programmed requirements due to late graduations of "A" schools and the late reporting of trainees to OJT sites during the month of September.

(f) Chart 54 shows the total inputs and outputs for the quarter and the number of personnel in training at the end of the quarter.

Chart 54



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## (5) Logistics.

(a) Logistics performance will be measured by examining:

- 1 Supply Center Performance.
- 2 Transportation Performance.
- 3 Craft Availability.


(b) Supply Center Performance. VNN Supply Center performance data and standards established for the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Management System (RIMMS) are listed in Table 5. Customer satisfaction measures the percent of valid requisitions which are filled. Stockage satisfaction measures the percent of valid requisitions which are filled by the Supply Center load listings. Demand accommodation is the percentage of valid requisitions which are matched by the Supply Center load list, whether or not the actual items were in stock. Rejection rate is the percent of requisitions which were incomplete or improperly submitted and therefore rejected. Taken together, the indicators reveal that the Supply Center has a valid load list and is able to meet customer demands.

TABLE 5

### SUPPLY EFFECTIVENESS

<u>INDICATOR</u>	<u>DESIRED</u>	<u>SATISFACTORY</u>	<u>30 SEP 70</u>
Customer Satisfaction	70%	60%	65%
Stockage Satisfaction	85%	75%	79%
Demand Accommodation	90%	75%	83%
Requisition Rejection Rate	10%	15%	5%

Chart 55



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(c) Transportation Performance. The number of tons of cargo and POL lifted by the logistic flotilla and the RIMMS standard are shown on Chart 55. The desired standard is based on average capacities and a 70 percent utilization of craft. During 3d Qtr CY 70, craft availability and employment were high; however, inefficient scheduling and cargo handling resulted in the standards not being met. The Joint General Staff (JGS) has scheduling control of most of the major logistic craft. The VNN logistic flotilla commander notifies the JGS when a craft is available for a mission. JGS then schedules a cargo lift mission. The practices of short notice, short loading, and no back-loading of cargo result in inefficient utilization of assets. The improved 2d quarter performance was due primarily to a sharp reduction in the amount of short loading.

(d) Craft Availability. Availability is a gross measure of VNN ability in craft maintenance and supply of spare parts. The USN and VNN presently have a single logistic tail, and USN facilities are responsible for the support of VNN craft until the turnover of all repair facilities in FY 72. The indicator is, therefore, currently a measure of the combined effort to maintain PCFs, PBRs, and RAC. Since the VNN facilities maintain the older craft, the indicator is a truer measure of strictly VNN capability, when consideration is given to the fact that some of these craft are 15 years old.

1 If a craft is capable of getting underway, it is considered available. The indicator does not measure the operability of armament, communications equipment, or auxiliary engineering equipment.

2 The availability of selected craft is shown on Chart 56.

a PCF/WPB availability exceeded the desired standard during the quarter. The VNN inventory of PCF/WPBs was more than doubled during the previous quarter. Their ability to maintain their craft will be more evident in future quarters.

b PBR availability was good during the quarter. An average of 85 percent of the craft were available during the quarter, just 5 percent below the desired standard.

c River assault craft (RAID, PAG, and RID) remain below the desired standard of availability during the quarter; however, 77 percent of the craft were available for operations. This is the highest availability attained over the past seven quarters.

d Logistic lift craft continue to surpass the desired standard of availability with 75 percent of the craft available during the quarter, five percent above the desired standard.

### d. Operational Performance.

(1) Operational performance will be measured by examining:


## CONFIDENTIAL

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
Chart 56

## CRAFT AVAILABILITY

### PCF/WPB & PBR



### RIVER ASSAULT



### LOGISTICS LIFT



--- DESIRED AVAILABILITY

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(a) Craft Employment.

(b) Performance Indicators.

(2) Craft Employment. Employment is a measure of the VNN level of activity. A craft is employed if it gets underway. A fleet command ship, however, is considered employed the entire time it is deployed from Saigon, even if it is in port. The indicator does not reveal whether the unit was gainfully employed. The indicator must be used in conjunction with advisor's reports and the performance indicators. Charts 57 and 58 show quarterly craft employment statistics for 1969 and the first three quarters of CY 70.

(a) The standards for employment were based, for older craft, upon past VNN performance, and for newer assets (PCF and WPB), on past USN performance.

(b) Coastal surveillance craft employment continued to be just below the desired standard. The major craft, PCF, and WPB, were 58 percent employed during the quarter, eight percent above the desired standard.

(c) River security craft employment continued to be above the desired standard with PBRs contributing their efforts to operations Ready Deck, Tran Hung Dao, Giant Sling Shot, and the Rung Sat Special Zone.

(d) River Assault Craft (RAG, RAID, RID) employment increased slightly over last quarter with a 76 percent quarterly average.


(e) Logistic lift craft employment was below the desired standard during the quarter. Inefficient scheduling practices are the main reason for these units not meeting their desired standard since their availability remains high.

(3) Performance Indicators. The four indicators listed in Table 6 have been developed to give an indication of the performance and readiness of three major VNN operating groups. These indicators have been normalized (averaged overall craft in a specific group). As a result, the numbers have meaning only when compared to a standard. The standard values were computed from historical data obtained on USN units operating in the three major operating groups. An expanded data base is being compiled to give more meaningful standards considering present operations. All four indicators must be used together and subjected to a value judgment to obtain a relative picture of VNN performance and readiness. The data are taken from VNN operational summaries, advisor's spot reports and the USN.


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VIETNAMESE NAVAL CRAFT EMPLOYMENT

COASTAL SURVEILLANCE CRAFT



RIVER SECURITY CRAFT



--- ASSIGNED

■ EMPLOYED

➤ DESIRED EMPLOYMENT

➤ SATISFACTORY EMPLOYMENT




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
Chart 58

## VIETNAMESE NAVAL CRAFT EMPLOYMENT

### RIVER ASSAULT CRAFT



### LOGISTICS LIFT CRAFT



--- ASSIGNED

■ EMPLOYED

➤ DESIRED EMPLOYMENT

➤ SATISFACTORY EMPLOYMENT

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Although these indicators were chosen as possible comparison measures they often have little meaning because the VNN craft in Market Time, for example, have had less than one percent of the opportunity to get in fire-fights that USN PCF in river operations have had. In operations such as Giant Slingshot, where VNN river patrol groups are integrated with USN river divisions, it is difficult to detect any differences in readiness and training of the two navies.

TABLE 6  
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

<u>Indicator</u>				
<u>Coastal Divisions</u>	<u>Standard</u>	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>
Boats Damaged/Destroyed per Unit	.03	.00	.00	.02
Incidents per Unit	.54	.04	.06	.01
Friendly Casualties per Unit	.10	.00	.00	.01
Enemy Eliminated per Unit	.26	.00	.00	.00
<u>River Patrol Group</u>				
Boats Damaged/Destroyed per Unit	.37	.00	.01	.01
Incidents per Unit	.85	.17	.14	.11
Friendly Casualties per Unit	.15	.01	.01	.01
Enemy Eliminated per Unit	.52	.02	.06	.05
<u>River Assault &amp; Interdiction Divisions</u>				
Boats Damaged/Destroyed per Unit	.27	.01	.01	.01
Incidents per Unit	.17	.05	.04	.02
Friendly Casualties per Unit	.27	.01	.02	.02
Enemy Eliminated per Unit	.22	.02	.01	.01

(a) Coastal Divisions. The VNN presently has three coastal flotillas divided into six coastal squadrons deployed on Market Time patrols. The VNN controls all of the inner barrier stations; all outer barrier stations are patrolled by USN forces. This turnover program has attained its assigned goals. Market Time patrol operations are relatively quiet in comparison to Sea Lords interdiction operations. Since only a few VNN PCFs are assigned to Sea Lords, the readiness and performance indicators show a large disparity from the standard, which is based on all PCF operations.

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(b) River Patrol Groups. With the turnover of 162 PBRs during the second quarter of 1970, the number of VNN River Patrol Groups (RPG) increased from four to twelve. Each RPG consists of 20 craft, with the exception of RPG 65 which has ten craft. The RPGs are tasked with maintaining the security of the waterways primarily in MR 3 and 4. RPG 65, with its ten craft, serves as an escort group on the Delta waterways.


(c) River Assault and Interdiction Divisions. There are six RAIDs consisting of approximately 15 boats per division. During the quarter, RAID 70 and 71 conducted interdiction operations in the Giant Slingshot AO. Also during this period, RAIDs 72 and 73 conducted assault operations while operating with VNN and ARVN in the U Minh Forest and lower delta regions while RAID 74 operated on the Bassac River and RAID 75 operated in the Ca Mau Peninsula region. There are six RIDs consisting of approximately 15 boats per division. RIDs 40, 43, and 44 were employed in the Giant Slingshot interdiction operation. RIDs 41 and 42 operated in Tran Hung Dao I, Barrier Reef, and Cambodian operations. RID 45 was deployed to Solid Anchor.

e. Area of Operational Responsibility. Chart 59 shows the location of the various riverine operations in MR 3 and MR 4. The combined operations join USN and VNN personnel in the same fighting effort, with the VNN eventually assuming total control of these operations. The VNN assumed command of Operation Barrier Reef during the quarter and Breezy Cove became a combined operation as Vietnamese units were assigned to the operation.

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Chart 59



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
f. Operational Results. Operational results attained by the VNN during the four quarters of 1969 and the first three quarters of 1970 are shown on Chart 60. The results attained against the enemy did not show much change from last quarter as action on the waterways remained light. Isolated incidents against Vietnamese units resulted in the largest number of friendly personnel casualties experienced during the past seven quarters. Twenty-five of the 54 VNN personnel killed resulted from actions at Operation Sea Float/Solid Anchor. The number of VNN craft damaged or put out of action was the largest experienced during CY 70. Sixteen craft were out of action and eight damaged as a result of enemy mines and rockets.

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
Chart 60

## VIETNAMESE NAVY RESULTS


### ENEMY-VNN CRAFT CAPTURED, DESTROYED, AND DAMAGED



### ENEMY ELIM-VNN KIA



### COASTAL CRAFT SEARCHED



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## GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ACTOVLOG	Accelerated Turnover Logistics Program
AKL	Attack Cargo, Light
ATF	Amphibious Task Force
ATG	Amphibious Task Group
CZ	Coastal Zone
DER	Destroyer Escort, Radar
JGS	Joint General Staff (Vietnamese)
LCMM	Landing Craft, Mechanized, Minesweeper
LCM	Landing Craft, Mechanized
LCM-8	Landing Craft, Mechanized Mark 8 (large LCM)
LCU	Landing Craft, Utility
LSIL	Landing Ship, Infantry, Large
LSSL	Landing Ship, Support, Large
LSM	Landing Ship, Medium
LST	Landing Ship, Tank
MASF	Military Assistance Service Funded
MLMS	Motor Launch Mine Sweeper
MR	Military Region
OJT	On the Job Training
PBR	Patrol Boat River
PC	Patrol Craft
PCE	Patrol Craft, Escort
PCF	Patrol Craft, Fast
PGM	Patrol Motor Gunboat
RAC	River Assault Craft
RAG	River Assault Group
RAID	River Assault and Interdiction Division
RID	River Interdiction Division
RPG	River Patrol Group
RSSZ	Rung Sat Special Zone
TF	Task Force
TG	Task Group
WPB	Coast Guard Patrol Boat
YOG	Coastal Oiler
YTL	Small Yard Tug

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## ANNEX A

### Enemy Contacts

Results per battalion in terms of number and hours of contact are shown in this annex for each major organization. Results are shown for total contacts, platoon-, company- and battalion- size contacts, and contacts by day and night.

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3RD QTR 70

CONTACTS

ALL MISSIONS  
ALL OPERATIONS

	ALL CONTACTS				PLATCON CONTACTS				STBN			
	NO.	BN	STBN	AVR	NO.	BN	STBN	AVR	NO.	BN	STBN	AVR
01 DIV	358	21.1	29.5	1.58	255	15.0	21.0	1.58	245	14.4	20.2	0.96
02 DIV	304	25.3	27.2	0.88	272	22.3	33.3	0.88	208	17.3	25.5	0.76
03 DIV	67	16.8	17.9	1.04	67	16.8	17.9	1.04	70	17.5	18.7	1.04
04 DIV	729	22.1	30.3	1.24	594	18.0	24.7	1.24	523	15.8	21.8	0.88
05 DIV	141	11.7	15.4	0.75	126	10.5	13.8	0.75	83	6.9	9.1	0.66
06 DIV	89	7.4	10.6	0.73	75	6.2	9.0	0.73	46	3.8	5.5	0.61
07 DIV	30	7.5	11.5	0.87	29	7.3	11.2	0.87	24	6.0	9.2	0.83
08 DIV	260	9.3	12.9	0.76	230	8.2	11.4	0.76	153	5.5	7.6	0.67
09 DIV	59	4.9	5.8	1.08	52	4.3	5.1	1.08	57	4.7	5.6	1.10
10 DIV	46	7.2	8.6	1.01	42	3.5	4.2	1.01	31	2.6	3.1	0.74
11 DIV	114	9.5	11.1	1.06	100	8.3	5.7	1.06	101	8.4	5.8	1.01
12 DIV	255	7.2	8.5	1.05	194	5.4	6.4	1.05	189	5.2	6.2	0.97
13 DIV	174	14.5	19.7	1.18	148	12.3	16.8	1.18	154	12.8	17.5	1.04
14 DIV	168	14.0	19.7	1.52	98	8.2	11.6	1.52	129	10.7	15.3	1.32
15 DIV	182	15.2	20.4	1.55	104	8.7	15.6	1.55	116	9.7	17.4	1.12
16 DIV	524	14.6	21.9	1.42	350	9.7	14.6	1.42	399	11.1	16.7	1.14
INF TOTALS	1772	13.3	18.0	1.19	1368	10.3	13.9	1.19	1264	9.5	12.8	0.92
CV 1 CTZ	31	7.8	6.5	2.32	27	6.8	5.7	2.32	28	7.0	5.9	1.04
CV 2 CTZ	05	1.7	1.6	0.60	05	1.7	1.6	0.60	03	1.0	1.0	0.60
CV 3 CTZ	55	11.0	10.4	2.33	31	6.2	5.9	2.33	41	8.2	7.8	1.32
CV 4 CTZ	35	7.0	6.3	1.77	25	5.0	4.5	1.77	32	6.4	5.7	1.28
CV TOTALS	126	7.4	6.7	2.10	88	5.2	4.7	2.10	104	6.1	5.5	1.18
BN 1 CTZ	06	18.0	21.8	0.17	06	18.0	21.8	0.17	01	3.0	3.6	0.17
BN 2 CTZ	48	16.0	18.3	0.56	44	14.7	16.8	0.56	21	7.0	8.0	0.48
BN 3 CTZ	08	3.0	3.6	1.00	08	3.0	3.6	1.00	08	3.0	3.6	1.00
BN 4 CTZ	58	6.4	8.3	1.10	42	4.7	6.0	1.10	41	4.6	5.9	0.98
BN TOTALS	70	14.0	21.7	1.54	61	12.2	18.9	1.54	82	16.4	25.4	1.34
AB DIV	41	4.6	5.5	1.54	36	4.0	5.2	1.54	37	4.1	5.3	1.03
VNMC	42	4.7	4.4	2.60	22	2.4	2.3	2.60	20	2.2	2.1	0.91
SPEC UNITS	305	7.3	7.9	1.62	307	5.6	6.1	1.62	314	5.7	6.2	1.02
AAVMA/VNMC	2171	11.5	14.6	1.27	1675	8.9	11.2	1.27	1578	8.4	10.6	0.94

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ALL MISSIONS ALL OPERATIONS		CON ACTS										3RD QTR 70									
		COMPANY CONTACTS					BATTALION CONTACTS					STON AVER									
		NO.	BN	STBN	AV	HRS	NO.	BN	STBN	AV	HRS	BN	STBN	AV	DUR						
01 DIV		85	5.0	7.0	22.7	275	16.2	22.7	6.9	3.24	45	2.6	3.7	2.50	2.00						
02 DIV		30	2.5	3.7	6.9	56	4.7	6.9	1.87	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	2.00	2.00						
51 REG		00	0.0	0.0	0.0	00	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00						
1 CTZ		115	3.5	4.8	13.8	331	10.0	13.8	2.88	2.0	49	1.5	2.0	2.45	2.45						
22 DIV		13	1.1	1.4	2.4	22	1.8	2.4	1.69	0.2	01	0.1	0.1	0.50	0.50						
23 DIV		12	1.0	1.4	1.8	15	1.2	1.8	1.25	0.2	04	0.3	0.5	2.00	2.00						
42 REG		01	0.3	0.4	0.8	02	0.5	0.8	2.00	0.0	00	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00						
11 CTZ		26	0.9	1.3	1.9	39	1.4	1.9	1.50	0.4	05	0.2	0.2	1.25	1.25						
05 DIV		07	0.6	0.7	0.7	07	0.6	0.7	1.00	0.0	00	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00						
18 DIV		31	2.6	3.1	2.7	27	2.2	2.7	0.87	13	29	2.4	2.9	2.23	2.23						
25 DIV		14	1.2	1.4	1.9	20	1.7	1.9	1.43	00	00	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00						
111 CTZ		52	1.4	1.7	1.8	54	1.5	1.8	1.04	13	29	0.8	1.0	2.23	2.23						
07 DIV		25	2.1	2.8	5.0	44	3.7	5.0	1.76	01	08	0.7	0.9	8.00	8.00						
09 DIV		53	4.4	6.3	11.2	94	7.8	11.2	1.77	17	33	2.7	3.9	1.94	1.94						
21 DIV		37	3.1	5.6	8.9	59	4.9	8.9	1.59	41	108	9.0	16.2	2.63	2.63						
1V CTZ		115	3.2	4.8	8.2	197	5.5	8.2	1.71	59	149	4.1	6.2	2.53	2.53						
INF TOTALS		308	2.3	3.1	6.3	621	4.7	6.3	2.02	96	232	1.7	2.4	2.42	2.42						
CV 1 CTZ		00	0.0	0.0	0.0	00	0.0	0.0	0.00	04	44	11.0	9.2	11.00	11.00						
CV 2 CTZ		00	0.0	0.0	0.0	00	0.0	0.0	0.00	00	00	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00						
CV 3 CTZ		18	3.6	3.4	10.6	56	11.2	10.6	3.11	06	31	6.2	5.9	5.17	5.17						
CV 4 CTZ		08	1.6	1.4	4.7	26	5.2	4.7	3.25	02	04	0.8	0.7	2.00	2.00						
CV TOTALS		26	1.5	1.4	4.8	82	4.8	4.4	3.15	12	79	4.6	4.2	6.58	6.58						
RN 0 CTZ		00	0.0	0.0	0.0	00	0.0	0.0	0.00	00	00	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00						
RN 1 CTZ		04	1.3	1.5	2.3	08	2.0	2.3	1.50	00	00	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00						
RN 2 CTZ		00	0.0	0.0	0.0	00	0.0	0.0	0.00	00	00	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00						
RN 3 CTZ		09	1.0	1.3	1.7	12	1.3	1.7	1.33	07	11	1.2	1.6	1.57	1.57						
RN 4 CTZ		05	1.0	1.5	4.3	14	2.8	4.3	2.80	04	12	2.4	3.7	3.00	3.00						
RN TOTALS		18	0.9	1.2	2.1	32	1.6	2.1	1.78	11	23	1.2	1.5	2.09	2.09						
AB DIV		05	0.6	0.7	3.8	26	2.5	3.8	5.20	00	00	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00						
VNMC		11	1.2	1.2	3.4	31	3.4	3.3	2.82	09	58	6.4	6.1	6.44	6.44						
SPEC UNITS		60	1.1	1.2	3.1	171	3.1	3.4	2.85	32	160	2.9	3.2	5.00	5.00						
AMVN/VNMC		368	2.0	2.5	4.2	792	4.2	5.3	2.15	128	392	2.1	2.6	3.06	3.06						

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ALL MISSIONS ALL OPERATIONS		CONTACTS										3RD QTR 70			
		ALL DAY CONTACTS					ALL-NIGHT CONTACTS					STON			
		NO.	BN	AV	STBN	HRS	BN	AV	STBN	HRS	NO.	BN	AV	STON	AVER
01 DIV		290	17.1	23.9	39.2	475	27.9	39.2	1.64	68	4.0	5.6	90	7.4	1.32
02 DIV		224	18.7	27.4	15.7	188	15.7	23.0	0.84	80	6.7	9.8	80	6.7	1.00
51 REG		35	8.8	9.3	45	11.3	12.0	1.29	32	8.0	8.5	25	6.3	6.7	0.79
1 CTZ		549	18.6	22.8	708	21.5	29.5	1.29	180	5.5	7.5	195	5.9	8.1	1.08
22 DIV		106	8.8	11.4	85	7.1	9.3	0.80	35	2.9	3.8	21	1.7	2.3	0.60
23 DIV		72	6.0	8.6	42	3.5	5.0	0.58	17	1.4	2.0	23	1.9	2.7	1.35
42 REG		17	4.3	6.5	18	4.5	6.9	1.06	13	3.3	5.0	08	2.0	3.1	0.62
11 CTZ		195	7.0	9.7	145	5.2	7.2	0.74	65	2.3	3.2	52	1.9	2.6	0.80
05 DIV		54	4.5	5.3	55	4.5	5.8	1.09	05	0.4	0.5	05	0.4	0.5	1.00
18 DIV		68	5.7	8.8	65	5.4	6.5	0.96	18	1.5	1.8	22	1.8	2.2	1.22
25 DIV		61	5.1	5.9	67	5.6	6.5	1.10	53	4.4	5.2	54	4.5	5.3	1.02
111 CTZ		183	5.1	6.0	191	5.3	6.3	1.04	76	2.1	2.5	81	2.2	2.7	1.07
07 DIV		142	11.8	16.1	170	14.2	19.3	1.20	32	2.7	3.6	36	3.0	4.1	1.13
09 DIV		134	11.2	15.5	199	16.6	23.6	1.49	34	2.8	4.0	57	4.7	6.8	1.68
21 DIV		131	10.9	19.7	191	15.5	28.7	1.46	51	4.2	7.7	92	7.7	13.8	1.80
IV CTZ		407	11.3	17.0	560	15.6	23.4	1.38	117	3.2	4.9	185	5.1	7.7	1.58
INF TOTALS		1334	10.0	13.5	1604	12.0	16.3	1.20	438	3.3	4.4	513	3.9	5.2	1.17
CV 1 CTZ		22	5.5	4.6	41	15.3	12.8	2.77	09	2.3	1.9	11	2.8	2.3	1.22
CV 2 CTZ		05	1.7	1.6	03	1.0	1.0	0.60	00	0.0	0.0	00	0.0	0.0	0.00
CV 3 CTZ		50	10.0	9.5	118	23.6	22.4	2.36	05	1.0	0.9	10	2.0	1.9	2.00
CV 4 CTZ		24	4.8	4.3	49	5.8	8.8	2.04	11	2.2	2.0	13	2.6	2.3	1.18
CV TOTALS		101	5.9	5.4	231	13.6	12.3	2.29	25	1.5	1.3	34	2.0	1.8	1.36
AN 0 CTZ		06	18.0	21.8	01	3.0	3.6	0.17	00	0.0	0.0	00	0.0	0.0	0.00
AN 1 CTZ		47	15.7	17.9	26	8.7	9.9	0.55	01	0.3	0.4	01	0.3	0.4	1.00
AN 2 CTZ		05	2.3	2.7	06	2.3	2.7	1.00	02	0.8	0.9	02	0.8	0.9	1.00
AN 3 CTZ		46	5.1	6.6	51	5.7	7.3	1.11	12	1.3	1.7	13	1.4	1.9	1.08
AN 4 CTZ		54	10.8	16.7	63	13.6	21.0	1.26	16	3.2	5.0	40	8.0	12.4	2.50
AN TOTALS		159	8.0	10.4	152	7.6	9.9	0.96	31	1.6	2.0	56	2.8	3.7	1.81
AB DIV		40	4.4	5.8	62	6.5	9.0	1.55	01	0.1	0.1	01	0.1	0.1	1.00
VNMC		36	4.0	3.8	102	11.3	10.8	2.83	06	0.7	0.6	07	0.8	0.7	1.17
SPEC UNITS		336	6.1	4.7	547	9.9	10.8	1.63	63	1.1	1.2	98	1.8	1.9	1.56
ARVN/VNMC		1670	8.9	11.2	2151	11.4	14.4	1.29	50	2.7	3.4	611	3.2	4.1	1.22

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ANNEX B

Enemy Initiated Incidents and Results

Shown in this annex by division and separate regiment are the numbers of enemy initiated incidents by type, whether day or night, and the resulting number of friendly KIA, WIA, MIA or captured; enemy eliminated; and weapons captured or lost.

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	ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS									
	INCID		EN KIA		FR KIA		FRIENDLY		WEAPONS	
	DL	N	DL	N	DL	N	WIA/MIA/CAPT		LOST	CAPT
1ST DIV										
ASSAULT	5	2	65	7	7	5	34	0	2	38
AMBUSH	9	0	6	4	4	1	6	0	0	8
ATTACK BY FIRE	94	8	0	0	25	4	39	0	0	0
TERR/SAB/HARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	33	0	0	0	12	0	58	0	0	0
2ND DIV										
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0
TERR/SAB/HARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	54	1	0	0	21	6	97	0	0	0
51ST REGT										
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	8	12	0	1	0	2	26	0	0	0
TERR/SAB/HARS	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	30	2	0	0	13	1	43	0	0	0

	ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS									
	INCID		EN KIA		FR KIA		FRIENDLY		WEAPONS	
	DL	N	DL	N	DL	N	WIA/MIA/CAPT		LOST	CAPT
22ND DIV										
ASSAULT	0	2	0	3	0	3	9	0	0	1
AMBUSH	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	9	2	5	0	2	0	11	0	0	3
TERR/SAB/HARS	4	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	30	1	0	0	10	0	39	0	1	2
23RD DIV										
ASSAULT	3	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TERR/SAB/HARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ASSAULT										
AMBUSH										
ATTACK BY FIRE										
TERR/SAB/HARS										
MINE/BOOBY TRAP										

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ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS										
	INCID DL N		EN KIA DL N		FR KIA DL N		FRIENDLY WIA/MIA/CAPT		WEAPONS LOST CAPT	
5TH DIV										
ASSAULT	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
AMBUSH	6	0	1	0	6	0	17	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	2	2	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
TERR/SAB/HARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	39	0	0	0	15	3	81	0	0	1
18TH DIV										
ASSAULT	2	4	1	1	1	6	15	0	0	1
AMBUSH	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	4	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TERR/SAB/HARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	6	0	0	0	5	0	13	0	0	0
25TH DIV										
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	2	0	0	0	1	3	0	0	0
TERR/SAB/HARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	47	1	0	0	5	3	71	0	0	0

ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS										
	INCID DL N		EN KIA DL N		FR KIA DL N		FRIENDLY WIA/MIA/CAPT		WEAPONS LOST CAPT	
7TH DIV										
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
TERR/SAB/HARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	219	20	0	0	41	33	430	0	0	0
9TH DIV										
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
AMBUSH	1	1	1	0	1	0	6	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	1	2	0	0	1	0	16	0	0	0
TERR/SAB/HARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	116	2	0	0	31	1	326	0	3	0
21ST DIV										
ASSAULT	5	6	12	14	0	9	58	0	0	13
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	8	0	0	0	0	23	0	0	0
TERR/SAB/HARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	60	8	0	2	7	8	147	0	0	2

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ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS										
	INCID		EN KIA		FR KIA		FRIENDLY		WEAPONS	
	DL	N	DL	N	DL	N	WIA/MIA/CAPT		LOST	CAPT
AIRBORNE										
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TERR/SAB/HARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	3	0	0	0	5	0	1	0	0	0
CAVALRY										
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	4	8	2	0	0	2	8	0	0	3
ATTACK BY FIRE	3	6	0	13	0	2	13	0	0	5
TERR/SAB/HARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	51	5	0	5	12	3	126	0	2	0
RANGERS										
ASSAULT	1	1	8	0	1	0	4	0	0	5
AMBUSH	3	1	1	0	7	0	28	0	0	1
ATTACK BY FIRE	1	3	3	0	0	0	8	0	0	0
TERR/SAB/HARS	0	3	0	0	0	1	11	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	91	7	0	1	56	4	275	0	0	0

ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS										
	INCID		EN KIA		FR KIA		FRIENDLY		WEAPONS	
	DL	N	DL	N	DL	N	WIA/MIA/CAPT		LOST	CAPT
MARINES										
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TERR/SAB/HARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	13	0	0	0	2	0	24	0	0	0
ASSAULT										
AMBUSH										
ATTACK BY FIRE										
TERR/SAB/HARS										
MINE/BOOBY TRAP										
ASSAULT										
AMBUSH										
ATTACK BY FIRE										
TERR/SAB/HARS										
MINE/BOOBY TRAP										

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## ANNEX C

### Effort, Results and Caches Discovered

1. Distribution of effort as shown in this annex is the percent of time spent on the different types of operations by divisions and separate battalions. Distribution of effort is based on the actual number of battalion days spent on each type of operation, against the number of battalion days available. The following definitions apply to the operations as used in this annex:

a. Combat Operations. Offensive actions where the primary mission is to locate and neutralize VC/NVA main force units, their equipment, base areas, and lines of communication.

b. Operations in Support of Pacification. Operations conducted in or adjacent to areas in which pacification is in progress.

(1) Pacification Active. Offensive operations which have the purpose of protecting pacification areas by neutralizing enemy district, provincial, local, and/or guerrilla forces and enemy infrastructure. This can include reconnaissance in force, direct attacks against located enemy forces, cordon and search operations, long range patrols, and ambushes.

(2) Pacification Static. Defensive operations which have the purpose of denying enemy access to pacification areas. This includes outposts, patrols, and strong points within the immediate vicinity of the protected area, and security and reserve missions which are in support of pacification.

c. Rehabilitation. Time spent restoring a unit's physical and mental strength with rest and resupply.

d. Reserve. Maneuver units, including alerted but not committed reaction forces, are in reserve when so designated by the appropriate commander and not otherwise employed.

e. Security Operations (Other than support of pacification). Operations conducted to protect the population, military, and political and economic resources and installations.

f. Training. Those missions in which forces are involved in training.

2. Pages C-2 to C-18 contain tabulations for distribution of effort (combat, security, pacification active, pacification static, reserve, training and rehabilitation), friendly KIA and enemy eliminated, captured or surrendered, weapons captured versus lost, and caches, as reported by all ARVN/VNMC organizations. Page C-18 contains tabulations for distribution of effort for the 2d Qtr CY 70 and the 3d Qtr CY 70 by major ARVN/VNMC organization.

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1 - CPODS 51 INFANTRY REGIMENT										
EFFORT					RESULTS					
UNITS	OCT TIME CPT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY ELIM	FRIENDLY KIA	OAS RATIO	ENEMY CPTD SURR	WEAPONS CPTD LIST	CASHES 2 100 100 295 100 FMS AMON
INF REGT RATINGS										
51 REGT	45.88	40.66	8.79	.00	66	22	2.9:1	12	0	1 35 11
INF BN RATINGS										
001 BN 51 REGT	22.83	61.96	9.78	.00	29	5	5.2:1	8	0	0 0 0
002 BN 51 REGT	61.36	21.27	7.95	.00	17	14	1.4:1	3	0	0 24 3
003 BN 51 REGT	67.39	13.04	11.96	.00	27	21	7.0:1	4	1	0 0 1 5
004 BN 51 REGT	32.61	59.78	5.43	.00	4	2	2.0:1	0	0	0 0 5
AVERAGE	45.87	40.65	8.79	.00	16.5	5.7	2.9:1	5.2	0.0	0.7 3.7 3.7

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COLOS 22 INFANTRY DIVISION

UNITS	EFFORT			RESULTS				CACHES		
	PCT TIME CPT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY BLK	FRIENDLY VIA	CAC RATIO	ENEMY CPTD SUPP	WFP NS CPTD LOST	100 LPS F300 F300
40 REGT	30.71	1.43	24.62	7.61	102	4	15.3:1	13	22	0
41 REGT	35.80	2.70	27.12	10.87	139	17	8.2:1	1	44	0
47 REGT	31.79	45.65	4.15	.00	72	64	12.0:1	0	15	0
AVERAGE	32.69	13.85	20.76	6.15	107.8	2.5	10.7:1	5.6	5.7	9.2
001 40 REGT	30.71	1.43	24.62	7.61	102	4	15.3:1	13	22	0
002 40 REGT	35.80	2.70	27.12	10.87	139	17	8.2:1	1	44	0
003 40 REGT	31.79	45.65	4.15	.00	72	64	12.0:1	0	15	0
004 40 REGT	32.69	13.85	20.76	6.15	107.8	2.5	10.7:1	5.6	5.7	9.2
001 41 REGT	30.71	1.43	24.62	7.61	102	4	15.3:1	13	22	0
002 41 REGT	35.80	2.70	27.12	10.87	139	17	8.2:1	1	44	0
003 41 REGT	31.79	45.65	4.15	.00	72	64	12.0:1	0	15	0
004 41 REGT	32.69	13.85	20.76	6.15	107.8	2.5	10.7:1	5.6	5.7	9.2
001 42 REGT	30.71	1.43	24.62	7.61	102	4	15.3:1	13	22	0
002 42 REGT	35.80	2.70	27.12	10.87	139	17	8.2:1	1	44	0
003 42 REGT	31.79	45.65	4.15	.00	72	64	12.0:1	0	15	0
004 42 REGT	32.69	13.85	20.76	6.15	107.8	2.5	10.7:1	5.6	5.7	9.2
001 43 REGT	30.71	1.43	24.62	7.61	102	4	15.3:1	13	22	0
002 43 REGT	35.80	2.70	27.12	10.87	139	17	8.2:1	1	44	0
003 43 REGT	31.79	45.65	4.15	.00	72	64	12.0:1	0	15	0
004 43 REGT	32.69	13.85	20.76	6.15	107.8	2.5	10.7:1	5.6	5.7	9.2
001 44 REGT	30.71	1.43	24.62	7.61	102	4	15.3:1	13	22	0
002 44 REGT	35.80	2.70	27.12	10.87	139	17	8.2:1	1	44	0
003 44 REGT	31.79	45.65	4.15	.00	72	64	12.0:1	0	15	0
004 44 REGT	32.69	13.85	20.76	6.15	107.8	2.5	10.7:1	5.6	5.7	9.2
001 45 REGT	30.71	1.43	24.62	7.61	102	4	15.3:1	13	22	0
002 45 REGT	35.80	2.70	27.12	10.87	139	17	8.2:1	1	44	0
003 45 REGT	31.79	45.65	4.15	.00	72	64	12.0:1	0	15	0
004 45 REGT	32.69	13.85	20.76	6.15	107.8	2.5	10.7:1	5.6	5.7	9.2
001 46 REGT	30.71	1.43	24.62	7.61	102	4	15.3:1	13	22	0
002 46 REGT	35.80	2.70	27.12	10.87	139	17	8.2:1	1	44	0
003 46 REGT	31.79	45.65	4.15	.00	72	64	12.0:1	0	15	0
004 46 REGT	32.69	13.85	20.76	6.15	107.8	2.5	10.7:1	5.6	5.7	9.2
001 47 REGT	30.71	1.43	24.62	7.61	102	4	15.3:1	13	22	0
002 47 REGT	35.80	2.70	27.12	10.87	139	17	8.2:1	1	44	0
003 47 REGT	31.79	45.65	4.15	.00	72	64	12.0:1	0	15	0
004 47 REGT	32.69	13.85	20.76	6.15	107.8	2.5	10.7:1	5.6	5.7	9.2
AVERAGE	32.69	13.85	20.76	6.15	107.8	2.5	10.7:1	5.6	5.7	9.2

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2 CORPS 42 INFANTRY REGIMENT

UNITS	EFFORT			RESULTS				CACHES			
	PCT TIME CRT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY ELIM	FRIENDLY KIA	CAS RATIO	ENEMY CPTD SURR	WEAPONS CPTD LOST	WEAPONS LOST	100 LRS 1000 AVG
INF REGT RATINGS											
42 REGT	53.26	16.58	.00	.00	51	10	5.1:1	0	19	4	21
INF BN RATINGS											
001 BN 42 REGT	64.57	22.51	.00	.00	10	1	110.0/1	0	2	1	0
002 BN 42 REGT	22.82	29.35	.00	.00	2	0		0	2	0	0
003 BN 42 REGT	41.83	4.35	.00	.00	19	8	2.4/1	0	8	2	1
004 BN 42 REGT	72.83	3.70	.00	.00	20	1	20.0/1	0	7	1	0
AVERAGE	53.26	16.57	.00	.00	12.7	2.5	5.10/1	.0	4.7	1.0	.5

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3 CORPS 05 INFANTRY DIVISION

UNITS	PCT TIME CMT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	EFFORT		PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY KIA	FAIRLY KIA	RESULTS		ENEMY CMTD SUB	WEAPONS LOST	WEAPONS FIND	100 LBS FIND
			PCT TIME	SECURITY					ENEMY KIA	FAIRLY KIA				
07 REGT	78.80	2.45	.00	.00	.00	.00	15	15	2.4:1	0	0	11	0	0
08 REGT	64.40	22.22	.00	.00	.00	.00	22	22	.9:1	2	1	5	0	4
09 REGT	85.60	12.50	.00	.00	.00	.00	7	7	7.1:1	1	0	19	0	4
INF BN RATINGS														
001 BN 07 REGT	55.43	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	1	1	.0:1	0	0	1	0	0
002 BN 07 REGT	72.13	3.78	.00	.00	.00	.00	2	2	.0:2	0	0	0	0	0
003 BN 07 REGT	52.39	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	12	12	3.0:1	0	0	11	0	0
004 BN 07 REGT	54.57	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	0	0	.0	0	0	0	0	0
001 BN 08 REGT	52.70	5.41	.00	.00	.00	.00	1	1	5.0:1	1	0	0	0	0
002 BN 08 REGT	55.43	36.96	.00	.00	.00	.00	9	9	.3:1	1	1	1	0	0
003 BN 08 REGT	45.65	49.41	.00	.00	.00	.00	7	7	.7:1	0	0	0	0	0
004 BN 08 REGT	97.82	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	4	4	1.8:1	0	0	4	0	0
001 BN 09 REGT	91.30	8.79	.00	.00	.00	.00	1	1	4.0:1	0	0	3	0	0
002 BN 09 REGT	71.74	20.65	.00	.00	.00	.00	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
003 BN 09 REGT	89.13	10.87	.00	.00	.00	.00	5	5	1.6:1	0	0	3	0	0
004 BN 09 REGT	90.72	9.78	.00	.00	.00	.00	1	1	38.0:1	1	0	12	0	0
AVERAGE	76.26	12.52	.00	.00	.00	.00	3.7	3.7	2.4:1	.2	.0	2.2	.0	1.0

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3 CORPS 19 INFANTRY DIVISION

UNITS	EFFORT			RESULTS				CACHES		
	PCT TIME CAT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY ELIM	ATTENDLY KIA	JAS RATIO	ENEMY CPTD SR	WEAPONS CPTD LIST	WEAPONS FROD AMMO
INF REGT RATINGS										
43 REGT	74.46	7.61	.00	.00	79	42	2.4:1	3	26	1
48 REGT	69.57	19.57	.00	.00	70	11	5.0:1	1	14	3
52 REGT	67.93	.54	.00	.00	117	13	5.0:1	1	16	1
INF BN RATINGS										
001 BN 43 REGT	52.17	13.04	.00	.00	19	7	2.7:1	1	5	4
002 BN 43 REGT	81.52	4.25	.00	.00	38	13	2.0:1	0	7	1
004 BN 43 REGT	88.04	11.96	.00	.00	0	7	4.0:1	0	7	0
004 BN 43 REGT	76.05	1.09	.00	.00	42	7	4.7:1	0	14	0
001 BN 48 REGT	68.48	.00	.00	.00	32	5	6.4:1	0	6	3
002 BN 48 REGT	50.00	44.57	.00	.00	28	0	28.0:1	0	5	0
003 BN 48 REGT	82.41	16.30	.00	.00	1	0	3.1:1	0	2	0
004 BN 48 REGT	77.17	17.39	.00	.00	9	6	1.5:1	1	4	0
001 BN 52 REGT	69.57	.00	.00	.00	28	2	14.0:1	13	4	0
002 BN 52 REGT	55.43	.00	.00	.00	43	4	10.8:1	0	4	0
003 BN 52 REGT	69.57	.00	.00	.00	20	5	4.0:1	2	7	0
004 BN 52 REGT	77.17	2.17	.00	.00	26	2	1.0:1	2	3	0
AVERAGE	70.65	9.23	.00	.00	23.8	5.5	4.1:1	1.7	4.8	1.3

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3 CORPS 25 INFANTRY DIVISION

UNITS	PCT TIME CAT OPS	EFFORT			ENEMY KIA	RESULTS		WEAPONS, CPTD LGST	CATHES		
		PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC		FRIENDLY KIA	ENEMY CPTD LGST		WEAPONS	100 LBS FOOD	100 LBS AMMO
INF REGT RATINGS											
46 REGT	95.38	.00	.00	.00	156	29	5.2:1	1	45	7	1
43 REGT	97.22	1.63	.00	.00	228	42	5.4:1	3	89	0	3
50 REGT	24.18	.82	72.28	.00	100	21	4.8:1	0	30	12	0
INF BN RATINGS											
001 9N 46 REGT	97.33	.00	.00	.00	145	11	4.1:1	13	9	3	1
002 3N 46 REGT	97.83	.00	.00	.00	46	13	3.3:1	9	13	0	0
003 8N 46 REGT	95.65	.00	.00	.00	55	4	13.8:1	6	21	0	0
004 9N 46 REGT	90.22	.00	.00	.00	10	1	10.0:1	1	2	0	0
001 8N 49 REGT	98.91	.00	.00	.00	82	6	13.7:1	4	1	24	0
002 3N 49 REGT	100.00	.00	.00	.00	30	7	4.3:1	2	1	10	0
003 9N 49 REGT	98.91	.00	.00	.00	47	10	4.2:1	8	1	24	0
004 8N 49 REGT	93.48	6.52	.00	.00	69	19	3.6:1	5	0	31	0
001 8N 50 REGT	36.96	.00	58.70	.00	34	8	4.3:1	0	0	7	0
002 4N 50 REGT	.00	3.26	26.74	.00	16	7	2.3:1	1	0	7	1
003 9N 50 REGT	32.61	.00	60.87	.00	7	2	3.5:1	0	0	12	0
004 8V 50 REGT	27.17	.00	72.93	.00	46	4	11.5:1	18	0	0	0
AVERAGE	72.46	.81	24.09	.00	40.34	7.6	5.2:1	5.5	12.6	1.0	3.0

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4 CORPS 07 INFANTRY DIVISION

UNITS	EFFORT			RESULTS				CACHES				
	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY SLN	FRIENDLY KIA	CAS RATIO	ENEMY CPTD SURR	WEAPNS CPTD LOST	WEAPONS	FOOD	100 LBS AMMO	
INF REGT RATINGS												
10 REGT	16.85	24.18	58.97	.00	674	31	21.1:1	183	79	52	0	10
11 REGT	55.16	18.75	4.35	.00	93	11	8.5:1	18	0	31	0	60
12 REGT	64.40	20.11	.00	.00	219	31	7.1:1	25	2	81	0	9
INF BN RATINGS												
001 BN 10 REGT	19.57	22.83	57.61	.00	206	3	51.5:1	43	32	12	0	3
002 BN 10 REGT	17.39	20.65	61.96	.00	153	9	17.0:1	49	15	10	0	3
003 BN 10 REGT	17.39	23.71	58.70	.00	181	11	16.5:1	61	15	13	0	2
004 BN 10 REGT	13.04	29.35	57.61	.00	134	8	16.8:1	30	17	17	0	2
001 BN 11 REGT	50.00	27.17	.00	.00	30	1	30.0:1	3	0	5	0	5
002 BN 11 REGT	55.43	7.61	6.52	.00	37	4	9.3:1	4	0	16	0	51
003 BN 11 REGT	59.78	14.13	7.61	.00	19	4	4.8:1	9	0	9	0	4
004 BN 11 REGT	55.43	26.09	3.26	.00	7	2	3.5:1	2	0	7	0	0
001 BN 12 REGT	47.83	36.96	.00	.00	17	2	8.5:1	4	0	5	0	0
002 BN 12 REGT	69.57	20.65	.00	.00	68	15	4.5:1	6	2	23	0	4
003 BN 12 REGT	73.91	16.30	.00	.00	79	8	9.9:1	6	0	18	0	1
004 BN 12 REGT	66.30	6.52	.00	.00	55	6	9.2:1	9	0	35	0	4
AVERAGE	45.47	21.01	21.10	.00	82.2	6.0	13.3:1	18.8	6.7	13.6	6.2	6.5

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4 CO-PS 09 INFANTRY DIVISION

UNITS	EFFORT			RESULTS			CACHES				
	PCT TIME CNT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY ELIM	FRIENDLY KIA	JAC RATIO	ENEMY CPTD SUHR	WEAPONS CPTD LOST	WEAPONS F000	100 LRS 100 MMO
INF REGT RATINGS											
14 REGT	63.86	6.52	.00	14.40	125	27	4.6:1	3	2	0	14
15 REGT	82.05	4.89	.00	.00	212	47	4.5:1	11	1	0	2
16 REGT	65.22	12.50	.00	.00	216	38	5.7:1	39	0	0	0
INF 4N RATINGS											
001 4N 14 REGT	70.65	.00	.00	11.96	41	11	3.7:1	0	1	0	0
002 4N 14 REGT	59.78	22.83	.00	.00	11	9	1.2:1	0	1	0	14
003 4N 14 REGT	51.09	.00	.00	19.04	31	6	5.2:1	1	0	0	0
004 4N 14 REGT	73.91	3.26	.00	7.61	42	1	42.0:1	2	0	0	0
001 4N 15 REGT	90.22	.00	.00	.00	48	28	1.7:1	1	0	0	0
002 4N 15 REGT	93.48	.00	.00	.00	82	9	10.3:1	5	0	0	0
003 4N 15 REGT	69.57	19.57	.00	.00	31	5	5.2:1	1	0	0	0
004 4N 15 REGT	86.96	.00	.00	.00	51	5	10.2:1	4	1	0	0
001 4N 16 REGT	89.13	.00	.00	.00	79	6	13.2:1	6	0	0	0
002 4N 16 REGT	41.30	9.78	.00	.00	69	6	11.5:1	14	0	0	0
003 4N 16 REGT	52.17	32.61	.00	.00	59	6	9.8:1	19	0	0	0
004 4N 16 REGT	78.76	7.61	.00	.00	9	20	.5:1	0	0	0	0
AVERAGE	71.37	7.97	.00	4.80	46.1	9.3	4.0:1	4.4	.2	11.8	1.3

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4 CORPS 21 INFANTRY DIVISION

UNITS	EFFORT			RESULTS			CACHES			
	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY ELIM	FRIENDLY KIA	CAS RATIO	ENEMY CPTD SUPP	WEAPONS CPTD LOST	WEAPONS FORD	100 LBS LPS AMMO
INF REGT RATINGS										
31 REGT	46.20	7.34	2.99	298	44	6.8:1	31	0	0	1
32 REGT	61.14	8.42	.00	391	4	97.8:1	12	0	12	1
33 REGT	24.18	51.08	17.39	196	39	5.0:1	18	2	0	1
INF BN RATINGS										
001 BN 31 REGT	51.09	21.74	.00	38	12	3.2:1	5	0	0	0
002 BN 31 REGT	50.00	.00	.00	75	8	9.2:1	10	0	0	0
003 BN 31 REGT	54.35	7.61	.00	105	17	6.2:1	10	0	0	0
004 BN 31 REGT	29.35	.00	11.96	80	7	11.4:1	6	0	0	1
001 BN 32 REGT	77.17	.00	.00	120	0	120.0:1	0	0	37	1
002 BN 32 REGT	43.48	33.70	.00	110	1	110.0:1	0	0	0	0
003 BN 32 REGT	47.93	.00	.00	35	2	17.5:1	2	0	0	0
004 BN 32 REGT	76.08	.00	.00	126	1	126.0:1	10	0	0	0
001 BN 33 REGT	10.87	17.39	66.30	14	4	3.5:1	0	0	0	0
002 BN 33 REGT	23.91	69.57	.00	55	18	3.1:1	0	0	0	0
003 BN 33 REGT	27.17	58.70	3.26	52	10	5.2:1	1	0	0	0
004 BN 33 REGT	34.78	58.70	.00	75	7	10.7:1	17	2	0	0
AVERAGE	43.84	22.28	6.79	73.8	7.2	10.2:1	5.0	.1	18.4	1.0

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AIRBORNE DIVISION													
UNITS	EFFORT				RESULTS				CACHES				
	PCT TIME	PCT TIME	PCT TIME	PCT TIME	ENEMY	FRIENDLY	CAS	ENEMY	WEAPONS	WEAPONS	WEAPONS	FOOD	100
	CBT OPS	SECURITY	PAC ACTIVE	PAC STATIC	ELIM	KIA	RATIO	CPTD SURP	CPTD LOST	LBS	AMMO	LBS	AMMO
001 ABN BN	.00	.00	.00	.00	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
002 ABN BN	66.30	.00	.00	.00	31	12	2.6:1	5	0	45	0	696	0
003 ABN BN	66.30	.00	.00	.00	8	2	4.0:1	1	0	9	0	0	35
005 ABN BN	70.65	13.04	.00	.00	57	8	4.6:1	6	0	10	0	0	0
006 ABN BN	1.09	59.78	.00	.00	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
007 ABN BN	.00	11.96	.00	.00	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
008 ABN BN	77.17	3.26	.00	.00	26	2	13.0:1	2	1	16	0	0	0
009 ABN BN	21.74	27.17	.00	.00	21	3	7.0:1	0	0	7	0	0	0
011 ABN BN	1.09	.00	.00	.00	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AVERAGE	33.81	12.80	.00	.00	13.7	3.0	4.6:1	1.5	9.6	5.6	77.3	3.8	

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ARMED CAVALRY SQUADONS

UNITS	PCT TIME CAT UNITS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME P.T. PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY ELIM	FRIENDLY KIA	CAS KATAD	ENEMY COTO SURS	WEAPONS COTO LIST	RESULTS		CATCHES	
										100 LBS	100 LBS	100 LBS	100 LBS
101 CAV SQDN	48:01	29:35	.10	.00	2	0	2:0:1	0	0	0	0	0	0
102 CAV SQDN	76:37	.30	.10	.00	24	0	24:0:1	0	0	0	0	0	0
103 CAV SQDN	.00	74:26	.00	.00	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
104 CAV SQDN	14:13	14:16	.00	.00	39	1	39:0:1	0	0	0	0	0	0
105 CAV SQDN	77:37	5:4	.00	.00	78	13	5:6:1	14	3	0	0	0	0
106 CAV SQDN	3:03	15:30	.00	.00	3	0	.6:1	0	4	0	0	0	0
107 CAV SQDN	37:13	12:27	.00	.00	26	0	26:0:1	0	13	0	0	0	0
108 CAV SQDN	4:05	27:23	.00	.00	3	0	3:0:1	0	1	0	0	0	0
109 CAV SQDN	76:05	4:23	.00	.00	10	0	3:3:1	0	1	0	0	0	0
110 CAV SQDN	5:13	.00	.00	.00	45	0	22:5:1	0	14	0	0	0	0
111 CAV SQDN	5:27	44:11	.00	.00	147	0	21:0:1	0	40	0	0	0	0
112 CAV SQDN	42:00	.00	.00	.00	44	0	8:8:1	0	14	0	0	0	0
113 CAV SQDN	5:00	13:33	.00	.00	2	0	2:0:1	0	3	0	0	0	0
114 CAV SQDN	7:24	10:24	.00	.00	125	0	25:0:1	0	3	0	0	0	0
115 CAV SQDN	6:23	.00	.00	.00	82	0	41:0:1	0	15	0	0	0	0
116 CAV SQDN	31:22	59:53	.00	.00	48	0	8:0:1	14	0	0	0	0	0
117 CAV SQDN	6:14	.00	.00	.00	167	0	15:2:1	0	0	0	0	0	0
118 CAV SQDN	47:15	4:46	.00	.00	49.7	0	13:9:1	1.1	13.3	0	0	0	0

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RANGER BATTALIONS

UNITS	PCT TIME CST OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	EFFORT		PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY SIN	FRIENDLY KIA	RESULTS		WEAPONS FWD	100 LBS
			EFFORT						RATIO	CPTD SUP		
011 RANGER BN	16.30	41.30	.00	.00	.00	.00	3	1	3.0:1	2	0	1
021 RANGER BN	38.04	48.91	.00	.00	.00	.00	19	3	3.4:1	1	0	43
022 RANGER BN	27.7	10.77	.00	.00	.00	.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
023 RANGER BN	40.22	25.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	20	0	20.0:1	17	0	0
030 RANGER BN	8.70	91.30	.00	.00	.00	.00	29	16	1.8:1	1	0	0
031 RANGER BN	23.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	107	26	2.8:1	6	0	0
032 RANGER BN	50.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	33	4	4.0:1	1	0	0
033 RANGER BN	19.57	69.57	.00	.00	.00	.00	16	1	.0:3	0	0	0
034 RANGER BN	45.65	31.11	.00	.00	.00	.00	0	1	0.0:1	0	0	0
035 RANGER BN	50.00	46.74	.00	.00	.00	.00	6	0	3.0:1	0	0	0
036 RANGER BN	86.96	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	3	0	1.3:1	0	0	0
037 RANGER BN	41.43	20.43	.00	.00	.00	.00	5	4	1.3:1	0	0	0
038 RANGER BN	.00	73.01	.00	.00	.00	.00	9	1	9.0:1	5	0	0
039 RANGER BN	55.42	14.13	.00	.00	.00	.00	15	8	1.9:1	0	0	0
041 RANGER BN	79.35	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	221	11	12.3:1	11	0	0
042 RANGER BN	78.26	13.04	.00	.00	.00	.00	24	41	.6:1	3	0	0
043 RANGER BN	26.09	13.04	.00	.00	.00	.00	70	17	5.8:1	13	0	0
044 RANGER BN	52.17	12.47	.00	.00	.00	.00	43	14	3.0:1	0	0	0
051 RANGER BN	53.26	5.43	.00	.00	.00	.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
052 RANGER BN	73.21	8.70	.00	.00	.00	.00	32	5	6.4:1	1	0	0
AVERAGE	46.43	27.11	.01	.26	.01	.26	32.8	9.1	3.6:1	3.6	2.2	61.3

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VIETNAMESE MARINE DIVISION

UNITS	PCT TIME CAT OPS	EFFORT			PCT TIME DAG	PCT TIME DAG	PCT TIME DAG	RESULTS			CACHES		
		PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME ACTIVE	PCT TIME STATIC				FRIENDLY KIA	ENEMY BILLY	ENEMY CPTD SURR	WEAPONS CPTD LOST	WEAPONS FOUD	100 LPS AMMO
001 MARINE BN	64.13	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	0	16	6	0	0	0
002 MARINE BN	63.04	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	0	2	0	0	0	0
003 MARINE BN	68.48	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	2	27	4	0	0	5
004 MARINE BN	90.22	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	5	28	7	0	0	1
005 MARINE BN	81.52	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	5	15	0	0	0	1
006 MARINE BN	81.52	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	1	90	9	0	0	1
007 MARINE BN	100.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	8	111	24	0	0	12
008 MARINE BN	41.30	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	0	0	0	0	4	1
009 MARINE BN	20.15	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	0	108	26	0	0	4
AVERAGE	67.27	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	2.5	44.1	8.4	12.1	44.0	15.7

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DISTRIBUTION OF EFFORT FOR 2ND & 3RD QTR CY 70									
ACTIVITY	PCT TIME ON COMBAT OPS	PCT TIME ON SECUR	PCT TIME ON PCT ACTIVE	PCT TIME ON PCT STATIC	PCT TIME ON RESERVE	PCT TIME ON TRAINING	PCT TIME ON REHABILITATION	2ND QTR	3RD QTR
01 CIV	31.54	31.54	15.45	15.45	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
02 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
03 CIV	55.40	55.40	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
04 CIV	65.71	65.71	18.41	18.41	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
05 CIV	33.27	33.27	15.45	15.45	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
06 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
07 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
08 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
09 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
10 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
11 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
12 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
13 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
14 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
15 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
16 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
17 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
18 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
19 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
20 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
21 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
22 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
23 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
24 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
25 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
26 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
27 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
28 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
29 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
30 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
31 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
32 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
33 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
34 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
35 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
36 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
37 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
38 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
39 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
40 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
41 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
42 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
43 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
44 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
45 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
46 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
47 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
48 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
49 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
50 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
51 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
52 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
53 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
54 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
55 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
56 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
57 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
58 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
59 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
60 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
61 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
62 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
63 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
64 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
65 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
66 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
67 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
68 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
69 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
70 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
71 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
72 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
73 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
74 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
75 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
76 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
77 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
78 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
79 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
80 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
81 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
82 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
83 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
84 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
85 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
86 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
87 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
88 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
89 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
90 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
91 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
92 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
93 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
94 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
95 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
96 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
97 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
98 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
99 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
100 CIV	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
TOTALS	44.73	44.73	21.42	21.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

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ANNEX D

Advisors' Assessment Tables

These tables depict the advisors' assessment of divisions, separate regiments, and special organizations as derived from responses to the Quarterly Effectiveness Report (SEER Questionnaire as revised, effective 4th Qtr CY 69). Battalion ratings are derived from the combination of battalion and regimental advisors' assessments. The regimental ratings are derived from the combination of regimental and division advisors' assessments.

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1 DIVISION 1 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	EFFLCTV IVENESS	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
DIV HQ RATNG	74.67	77.14	95.00	80.00	80.00	65.00	89.00	93.00
REGT HQ RATINGS								
1 REGT	95.71	70.91	100.00	80.00	60.00	56.67	85.45	98.00
2 REGT	96.00	74.55	100.00	86.67	80.00	76.67	87.69	94.00
3 REGT	92.57	85.45	100.00	93.33	90.00	73.33	91.72	100.00
54 REGT	87.14	72.73	95.00	80.00	50.00	50.00	72.80	76.00
REGT HQ AVERAGE	94.36	75.91	98.75	85.00	72.50	64.17	84.42	92.00
INF BN RATINGS								
1 BN 1 REGT	91.54	74.29	0.0	62.86	83.33	70.00	88.33	91.67
2 BN 1 REGT	75.56	71.43	0.0	54.29	83.33	67.14	81.67	76.67
3 BN 1 REGT	93.33	78.67	100.00	57.14	93.33	68.57	84.80	95.00
4 BN 1 REGT	90.37	74.29	0.0	60.00	86.67	64.29	84.17	88.33
1 BN 2 REGT	99.29	88.24	100.00	95.56	90.00	77.33	84.80	96.67
2 BN 2 REGT	82.35	76.43	0.0	61.67	63.33	72.00	63.81	86.67
3 BN 2 REGT	89.63	76.77	0.0	78.18	72.00	60.00	81.82	88.33
4 BN 2 REGT	84.44	84.00	100.00	57.65	66.67	62.86	66.36	83.33
5 BN 2 REGT	82.96	80.00	100.00	74.29	81.57	75.33	76.09	84.17
1 BN 3 REGT	94.81	90.56	100.00	76.67	90.80	73.75	85.26	96.67
2 BN 3 REGT	94.61	90.56	100.00	76.67	90.00	73.75	83.86	96.67
3 BN 3 REGT	97.76	90.86	100.00	72.73	90.00	75.00	86.67	96.67
4 BN 3 REGT	91.11	89.44	100.00	75.00	90.00	72.50	83.86	88.33
1 BN 54 REGT	83.75	79.05	0.0	92.00	67.50	43.75	62.76	79.00
2 BN 54 REGT	67.08	70.34	80.00	71.43	65.00	48.12	56.74	60.87
3 BN 54 REGT	71.50	78.57	100.00	93.33	57.78	46.67	65.71	74.29

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1 DIVISION 1 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	JPER EFFECT FIVE	PERKS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
INF BN RATINGS								
4 BN 54 REGT	62.79	80.00	96.00	103.00	57.27	65.26	75.38	82.61
INF BN AVERAGE	66.95	80.79	97.82	74.08	77.99	65.67	77.18	86.23

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ORGANIZATION	OFFICE	PERSONNEL	CIVIL AFFAIRS	CURRENT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAINING	CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
101st AIRBORNE DIV	9400	60.00	25.00	90.00	70.00	52.00	75.86	80.00
101st AIRBORNE DIV	9400	74.24	34.50	100.00	30.00	55.18	85.71	96.00
101st AIRBORNE DIV	9400	70.00	85.00	95.33	30.00	54.55	70.20	78.00
101st AIRBORNE DIV	9400	60.57	80.00	96.67	50.00	45.45	52.08	70.00
101st AIRBORNE DIV	9400	72.32	82.50	96.67	76.67	52.73	63.33	78.00
101st AIRBORNE DIV	9400	85.00	90.00	75.00	90.00	60.00	73.33	74.17
101st AIRBORNE DIV	9400	91.11	82.50	56.35	85.67	73.33	83.21	90.00
101st AIRBORNE DIV	9400	85.71	90.00	60.00	85.67	81.25	78.00	90.83
101st AIRBORNE DIV	9400	53.33	82.50	73.33	86.67	60.00	71.67	90.00
101st AIRBORNE DIV	9400	71.18	77.14	78.95	53.33	34.07	55.22	39.17
101st AIRBORNE DIV	9400	78.75	92.50	89.41	63.33	58.12	56.67	70.00
101st AIRBORNE DIV	9400	77.50	82.33	88.00	69.09	53.75	68.33	73.33
101st AIRBORNE DIV	9400	80.51	95.00	89.41	85.00	61.25	78.28	80.83
101st AIRBORNE DIV	9400	78.57	100.00	65.33	75.00	62.00	55.85	78.95
101st AIRBORNE DIV	9400	70.71	0.0	70.91	68.33	56.00	66.67	67.00
101st AIRBORNE DIV	9400	73.55	80.00	77.33	80.00	60.69	62.45	80.83
101st AIRBORNE DIV	9400	74.44	80.00	69.33	70.00	71.33	58.98	77.50
101st AIRBORNE DIV	9400	79.21	56.63	74.45	77.42	60.98	68.22	76.05
101st AIRBORNE DIV	9400	78.00						

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51 INFANTRY REGIMENT 1 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	PER EFFECTIVENESS	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
INF REGT RATING								
51 REGT	95.56	83.00	70.00	84.00	90.00	69.00	90.40	91.58
INF BN RATINGS								
1 BN 51 REGT	87.14	85.88	70.00	68.00	83.33	71.43	80.00	88.33
2 BN 51 REGT	81.54	84.71	100.00	80.00	76.67	56.36	75.65	76.67
3 BN 51 REGT	87.41	85.88	80.00	70.00	83.33	64.29	80.80	83.33
4 BN 51 REGT	84.17	83.53	70.00	72.00	83.00	62.86	76.67	80.00
INF BN AVERAGE	85.00	85.00	80.00	72.50	80.83	63.73	78.28	82.08

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22 DIVISION 7 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	JPE EFFECT IVENESS	PER/S ONALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
DIV HQ RATING	78.46	68.89	60.00	70.00	60.00	41.82	74.48	83.33
REGT HQ RATINGS								
40 REGT	92.00	76.47	90.67	80.00	90.00	58.33	83.70	90.00
41 REGT	85.33	84.11	88.57	80.00	70.00	46.67	75.69	89.00
42 REGT	83.57	61.25	94.29	65.00	75.00	55.00	73.20	82.00
47 REGT	80.71	72.66	60.00	70.00	95.00	45.00	54.62	78.00
REGT HQ AVERAGE	85.40	72.92	84.86	63.75	72.50	51.25	71.80	84.75

INF BN RATINGS

1 BN 40 REGT	69.00	65.14	100.00	84.00	96.57	51.25	81.00	80.83
2 BN 40 REGT	93.88	64.12	83.57	96.00	100.00	76.52	90.00	92.50
3 BN 40 REGT	86.12	65.88	93.33	100.00	96.67	61.38	82.41	84.17
4 BN 40 REGT	96.93	87.06	93.33	100.00	95.00	78.75	97.20	98.33
1 BN 41 REGT	83.33	86.67	90.00	46.67	80.00	40.00	77.50	91.11
2 BN 41 REGT	73.65	74.61	95.00	47.50	66.67	42.50	65.83	72.50
3 BN 41 REGT	68.50	76.47	53.33	76.00	85.00	74.67	58.57	68.33
4 BN 41 REGT	94.25	90.00	80.00	40.00	100.00	63.00	87.59	90.00
1 BN 42 REGT	81.96	71.94	93.33	80.00	53.33	65.52	77.37	83.33
2 BN 42 REGT	81.70	78.13	97.50	80.00	95.00	76.55	77.11	83.64
3 BN 42 REGT	76.67	81.11	86.67	57.14	88.33	52.26	70.00	73.33
4 BN 42 REGT	84.91	75.15	92.50	57.50	86.67	74.48	78.60	86.67
1 BN 47 REGT	72.22	83.33	66.67	86.67	80.00	63.75	63.70	70.00
2 BN 47 REGT	86.43	86.67	75.00	66.67	90.00	52.50	62.67	83.33
3 BN 47 REGT	80.00	80.00	60.00	100.00	95.00	62.86	56.60	72.73
4 BN 47 REGT	83.70	83.53	80.00	86.67	90.00	55.00	67.83	83.33

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22 DIVISION 2 CORPS		OPER	PERSONNEL	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAINING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
ORGANIZATION	EFFECTIVENESS	PERSONNEL MORALE							
INF BN RATINGS									
INF BN AVERAGE		83.42	81.88	84.08	75.30	89.27	62.25	74.63	82.13

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# 23 DIVISION 2 CORPS

ORGANIZATION  
EFFECTIVE  
JUNE 1955

DIV HQ RATING 77.33

REGT HQ RATINGS

44 REGT 91.43  
45 REGT 83.85  
53 REGT 83.57

REGT HQ AVERAGE 86.28

INF BN RATINGS

1 BN 44 REGT 85.93  
2 BN 44 REGT 82.50  
3 BN 44 REGT 81.20  
4 BN 44 REGT 68.21  
1 BN 45 REGT 73.62  
2 BN 45 REGT 90.21  
3 BN 45 REGT 94.47  
4 BN 45 REGT 90.73  
1 BN 53 REGT 72.50  
2 BN 53 REGT 74.18  
3 BN 53 REGT 67.32  
4 BN 53 REGT 79.58

INF BN AVERAGE 80.25

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LEADER SHIP  
COMMAND CONTROL STAFF  
TRAINING  
SUPPLY MAINT  
COMBAT SUPPORT  
CIVIL AFFAIRS  
GENERAL  
74.83  
56.67  
70.00  
70.00  
70.00  
90.00  
90.00  
95.00  
93.33  
71.98  
81.67

84.62  
87.06  
76.76  
78.15  
78.79  
83.43  
82.13  
81.11  
75.09  
60.80  
75.27  
78.78  
78.91  
81.34

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5 DIVISION 3 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	OPER. EFFEC TIVENESS	PERS/ N JRALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
DIV HQ RATING	68.97	74.74	80.00	80.00	50.00	48.33	67.00	67.37
REGT HQ RATINGS								
7 REGT	92.67	88.18	100.00	90.00	65.00	61.67	81.07	92.00
8 REGT	61.43	72.00	100.00	86.67	70.00	40.57	69.06	65.00
9 REGT	67.20	67.78	92.50	70.00	40.00	26.67	46.42	65.00
REGT HQ AVERAGE	80.43	75.99	97.50	82.22	58.33	45.00	65.51	80.67
INF BN RATINGS								
1 BN 7 REGT	71.54	66.45	100.00	93.33	80.00	72.41	75.69	72.94
2 BN 7 REGT	86.54	86.00	100.00	100.00	81.67	66.87	79.62	90.00
3 BN 7 REGT	77.04	85.86	95.00	100.00	80.00	62.50	77.69	73.33
4 BN 7 REGT	69.00	61.43	96.00	100.00	76.67	68.75	78.57	92.50
1 BN 8 REGT	80.00	74.24	100.00	96.00	70.00	48.57	69.57	82.86
2 BN 8 REGT	86.12	77.50	80.00	93.33	71.67	69.57	79.11	89.09
3 BN 8 REGT	87.14	82.23	100.00	77.14	83.33	69.57	81.43	86.96
4 BN 8 REGT	83.81	79.23	100.00	90.00	75.55	60.00	87.50	88.57
1 BN 9 REGT	69.41	77.50	100.00	100.00	70.00	58.33	73.75	92.00
2 BN 9 REGT	80.67	85.33	60.00	100.00	90.00	68.75	84.29	85.00
3 BN 9 REGT	74.62	70.00	60.00	93.33	53.33	48.00	50.00	83.33
4 BN 9 REGT	70.00	72.31	90.00	73.33	76.67	57.14	63.00	70.00
INF BN AVERAGE	80.16	80.30	90.08	93.54	75.74	63.37	75.02	83.88

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1. DIVISION GROUPS

ORGANIZATION	PER LFFL- TIVENESS	PERS/ MURALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
DIV HQ RATING	90.00	88.88	86.67	80.00	75.90	46.00	78.98	82.86

REGT HQ RATINGS

43 REGT	89.29	71.11	100.00	86.67	80.00	46.67	78.40	83.33
48 REGT	90.43	73.23	90.00	80.00	70.00	40.00	68.89	80.00
52 REGT	92.00	86.67	100.00	90.00	80.00	53.33	76.84	78.00
REGT HQ AVERAGE	90.58	70.37	96.67	85.56	76.67	46.67	74.71	80.44

INF BN RATINGS

1 BN 43 REGT	94.09	85.88	93.33	90.00	85.00	71.88	81.70	88.33
2 BN 43 REGT	86.98	76.36	94.29	90.00	78.00	65.00	75.38	85.00
3 BN 43 REGT	81.43	81.43	80.00	90.00	80.00	54.29	62.08	71.67
4 BN 43 REGT	95.24	86.00	0.0	100.00	73.33	42.73	65.00	89.17
1 BN 48 REGT	81.48	78.82	93.33	80.00	68.00	36.00	71.25	80.00
2 BN 48 REGT	91.70	84.57	96.67	85.00	86.67	57.60	80.00	88.33
3 BN 48 REGT	64.10	76.43	76.00	100.00	78.00	28.00	60.56	62.00
4 BN 48 REGT	80.00	80.00	91.43	85.00	73.33	43.75	70.94	79.17
1 BN 52 REGT	76.00	80.00	0.0	0.0	63.33	48.89	44.00	50.00
2 BN 52 REGT	84.62	73.35	100.00	86.67	67.50	53.68	56.36	72.94
3 BN 52 REGT	66.57	83.48	0.0	0.0	53.33	40.00	40.00	60.00
4 BN 52 REGT	70.37	66.67	86.67	89.09	63.33	55.00	63.10	69.17
INF BN AVERAGE	81.06	75.67	90.19	89.58	73.32	49.73	64.20	74.65

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25 DIVISION 3 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFECT TIVNESS	PECS/ MOBILE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	CUMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
DIV HQ RATING	93.10	74.44	80.00	80.00	70.00	71.67	76.00	89.47

REGT HQ RATINGS

46 REGT	95.17	74.44	87.50	84.00	70.00	74.00	76.67	91.00
49 REGT	90.00	72.00	80.00	84.00	70.00	70.00	81.05	92.00
50 REGT	94.40	70.00	75.00	80.00	75.00	72.73	74.14	89.00
REGT HQ AVERAGE	93.22	74.10	80.83	82.67	71.67	72.24	77.29	90.67

INF BN RATINGS

1 BN 46 REGT	94.23	80.42	86.07	100.00	90.00	69.37	89.78	94.17
2 BN 46 REGT	84.80	61.21	90.00	100.00	87.50	57.27	75.11	86.67
3 BN 46 REGT	90.21	80.00	83.33	100.00	80.00	55.71	77.63	94.17
4 BN 46 REGT	85.07	77.42	85.00	84.00	55.71	63.08	75.45	85.22
1 BN 49 REGT	74.07	72.44	85.00	100.00	85.67	55.00	68.33	80.00
2 BN 49 REGT	74.02	80.00	80.00	80.00	70.00	55.00	69.09	78.33
3 BN 49 REGT	94.44	78.00	80.00	96.00	83.33	56.25	86.67	80.00
4 BN 49 REGT	52.57	42.55	80.00	100.00	93.33	71.25	91.30	95.00
1 BN 50 REGT	76.73	70.00	85.00	92.00	76.67	57.33	58.55	63.64
2 BN 50 REGT	70.00	70.00	80.00	90.00	84.00	27.50	34.80	62.61
3 BN 50 REGT	80.83	78.10	77.14	100.00	88.00	51.43	59.17	82.61
4 BN 50 REGT	91.00	80.45	85.00	100.00	93.00	86.43	87.45	91.67
INF BN AVERAGE	84.27	74.00	84.76	96.00	82.77	59.64	72.79	82.84

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## 7 DIVISION 4 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	PEPS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
DIV HQ RATING	86.00	89.52	70.00	73.33	70.00	40.00	74.59	82.00
REGT HQ RATINGS								
10 REGT	91.43	76.00	90.00	93.33	73.00	63.33	74.48	88.00
11 REGT	76.67	68.00	75.00	60.00	80.00	50.00	57.78	73.00
12 REGT	89.23	63.33	80.00	66.67	73.00	53.33	74.44	77.78
REGT HQ AVERAGE	85.78	69.11	81.67	73.33	73.33	57.22	68.90	79.59
INF BN RATINGS								
1 BN 10 REGT	85.71	80.00	90.00	92.73	83.00	55.00	80.67	89.57
2 BN 10 REGT	87.14	81.18	90.00	92.73	80.00	55.00	80.67	90.00
3 BN 10 REGT	87.14	83.53	90.00	93.33	80.00	55.00	78.67	91.67
4 BN 10 REGT	86.07	83.53	90.00	93.33	83.00	55.00	78.67	91.67
1 BN 11 REGT	66.40	75.00	65.00	90.00	83.33	66.25	77.27	70.00
2 BN 11 REGT	78.00	79.27	75.00	86.67	83.33	66.67	74.67	80.83
3 BN 11 REGT	68.00	75.00	65.00	90.00	83.33	56.25	67.27	75.00
4 BN 11 REGT	66.40	75.00	65.00	90.00	83.33	65.16	67.27	70.00
1 BN 12 REGT	90.63	81.05	90.00	100.00	83.00	67.27	82.31	85.26
2 BN 12 REGT	85.29	74.55	90.00	82.86	75.00	70.91	85.71	82.00
3 BN 12 REGT	92.90	81.11	90.00	100.00	75.67	71.11	75.65	87.00
4 BN 12 REGT	91.58	81.33	86.67	97.14	75.00	40.00	82.22	83.33
INF BN AVERAGE	82.11	79.22	82.22	92.40	83.00	61.13	76.75	83.03

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3 DIVISION CORPS

ORGANIZATION	JPER EFFECT IVENESS	PERK/ MURALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
DIV HQ RATING	72.67	48.42	65.00	63.00	55.00	34.55	67.18	72.00

REGT HQ RATINGS

14 REGT	69.29	59.05	92.50	100.00	93.00	45.67	74.09	76.84
15 REGT	90.00	60.00	92.50	83.33	70.00	54.23	71.63	84.21
16 REGT	86.40	46.67	80.00	88.00	50.00	42.22	64.71	71.58
REGT HQ AVERAGE	88.73	55.24	88.33	87.78	73.00	47.72	70.14	77.54

INF BN RATINGS

1 BN 14 REGT	55.30	70.62	95.00	97.78	73.00	58.75	75.65	71.67
2 BN 14 REGT	75.93	70.20	100.00	81.67	51.67	66.87	88.77	79.17
3 BN 14 REGT	77.00	70.07	85.00	100.00	51.82	55.38	64.76	75.00
4 BN 14 REGT	80.00	08.39	100.00	100.00	98.33	48.00	69.80	86.67
1 BN 15 REGT	84.00	79.23	75.00	80.00	83.00	53.33	71.71	83.81
2 BN 15 REGT	90.00	80.00	87.50	93.00	81.67	75.71	79.13	81.67
3 BN 15 REGT	76.50	73.79	95.00	51.67	69.00	65.00	67.80	79.09
4 BN 15 REGT	80.71	72.17	90.00	80.00	87.50	0.0	84.00	96.32
1 BN 16 REGT	86.21	67.50	96.67	53.23	73.33	39.17	57.14	71.67
2 BN 16 REGT	84.29	72.22	96.29	73.53	63.00	38.89	57.14	70.43
3 BN 16 REGT	76.79	57.50	54.29	65.00	54.55	38.46	57.44	67.50
4 BN 16 REGT	69.64	56.92	97.50	54.00	33.33	38.10	54.21	55.00
INF BN AVERAGE	80.66	69.94	92.52	79.99	74.60	52.52	68.96	75.67

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21 DIVISION 4 10-70

ORGANIZATION	EFFEC- TIVENESS	PERSON- NEL	CIVIL AFFAIRS	CURRENT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	CURRENT CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
DIV HQ RATINGS	89.63	58.00	73.35	80.00	73.00	46.67	84.12	79.00
REGT HQ RATINGS								
31 REGT	89.63	60.00	71.43	93.35	75.00	46.67	67.45	85.00
32 REGT	74.42	74.00	77.50	86.67	55.00	86.67	83.33	92.00
33 REGT	71.55	59.59	70.00	66.67	55.00	40.00	51.82	63.00
REGT HQ AVERAGE	85.26	61.53	79.64	82.22	75.00	57.78	67.53	80.00
INF BN RATINGS								
1 BN 31 REGT	44.17	45.58	60.00	78.57	50.00	33.60	66.86	47.00
2 BN 31 REGT	87.17	77.05	72.00	100.00	81.67	50.62	55.22	85.00
3 BN 31 REGT	66.42	64.24	68.00	76.00	83.33	36.30	66.15	79.17
4 BN 31 REGT	75.77	71.72	71.43	95.00	83.33	44.71	66.87	81.05
1 BN 32 REGT	96.92	80.76	91.43	96.00	96.67	90.77	86.05	85.00
2 BN 32 REGT	89.63	77.42	92.50	72.50	83.33	57.41	81.78	92.50
3 BN 32 REGT	94.12	75.86	90.00	100.00	51.67	85.45	67.78	91.43
4 BN 32 REGT	81.67	66.39	68.00	64.00	83.33	59.20	68.42	85.83
1 BN 33 REGT	64.55	60.00	63.33	68.33	57.50	40.00	62.22	43.33
2 BN 33 REGT	63.00	63.00	65.71	78.33	70.91	23.53	45.00	55.24
3 BN 33 REGT	71.90	75.83	80.00	72.50	75.36	50.00	69.23	78.89
4 BN 33 REGT	76.67	72.60	80.00	75.56	71.11	36.00	65.45	82.50
INF BN AVERAGE	76.05	69.41	76.87	81.40	76.60	53.63	67.59	75.58

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AIRBORNE DIVISION

ORGANIZATION	OPER- EFFEC- TIVENESS	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
1 ABN BN	100.00	64.62	100.00	0.0	100.00	90.00	81.74	96.00
2 ABN BN	95.42	90.00	0.0	88.33	95.00	92.50	82.61	90.91
3 ABN BN	90.50	99.00	0.0	88.33	93.33	0.0	90.00	95.56
5 ABN BN	83.91	70.77	77.50	67.14	72.00	66.15	67.66	70.91
6 ABN BN	100.00	100.00	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.00
7 ABN BN	100.00	84.29	100.00	0.0	93.33	97.50	94.74	100.00
8 ABN BN	64.44	88.57	100.00	74.55	82.00	78.46	83.81	84.17
9 ABN BN	93.33	80.00	80.00	0.0	100.00	88.75	86.36	80.00
11 ABN BN	100.00	95.71	100.00	0.0	92.00	98.75	98.82	90.00
AVERAGE	94.18	88.11	92.92	79.59	90.96	87.46	85.72	89.73

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ARMED CAVALRY SQUADONS

UNCLASSIFIED	PERCENTAGE	PERSONNEL	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPLY	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAINING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
17 CAV SQUAD	27.31	77.65	100.00	72.50	83.33	48.75	64.00	91.67
17 CAV SQUAD	95.71	88.39	95.00	100.00	95.67	66.25	86.15	91.30
11 CAV SQUAD	74.48	82.35	90.00	60.00	83.33	56.25	63.48	71.67
4 CAV SQUAD	4.35	93.69	92.50	75.33	100.00	92.50	85.17	91.67
3 CAV SQUAD	75.56	74.40	86.67	86.67	93.00	43.33	59.20	83.16
14 CAV SQUAD	96.90	89.25	100.00	100.00	80.00	75.38	85.50	92.73
9 CAV SQUAD	10.34	78.89	80.00	69.33	86.67	64.37	65.52	80.00
15 CAV SQUAD	66.67	78.67	73.33	0.00	96.67	47.27	72.17	82.50
18 CAV SQUAD	98.52	89.33	73.33	0.00	100.00	52.50	93.33	90.00
1 CAV SQUAD	66.00	33.57	96.67	90.00	91.67	74.00	88.16	94.00
5 CAV SQUAD	94.12	88.24	100.00	100.00	96.67	59.33	85.33	96.00
10 CAV SQUAD	63.00	96.67	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	74.29	100.00
12 CAV SQUAD	75.00	91.67	80.00	80.00	81.67	47.37	72.68	74.17
16 CAV SQUAD	74.23	71.52	57.50	63.57	73.33	58.18	62.44	73.33
6 CAV SQUAD	96.00	10.00	80.00	80.00	100.00	80.95	87.20	96.36
1 CAV SQUAD	67.73	44.14	72.50	80.00	85.00	57.89	71.72	68.42
7 CAV SQUAD	79.17	74.81	100.00	100.00	68.89	36.92	68.15	72.63
AVERAGE	84.84	83.15	86.09	82.89	86.49	60.70	75.56	85.27

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1st GEN BATTALION

	1st GEN BATTALION	EFFEC	PERAS/	CIVIL	COMBAT	SUPPLY	TRAIN-	COMMAND	LEADER
		TIVNESS	PARALE	AFFAIRS	SUPPORT	MAINT	ING	CONTROL	SHIP
21	RANGER BN	77.04	84.12	0.0	50.50	80.00	61.43	69.60	88.33
27	RANGER BN	72.40	91.76	80.00	70.00	78.33	36.55	74.58	80.00
39	RANGER BN	78.48	78.89	77.50	59.33	63.33	52.31	61.54	78.33
11	RANGER BN	87.45	75.80	88.00	85.71	91.67	65.00	75.74	81.67
22	RANGER BN	90.00	85.71	82.50	89.09	90.00	88.75	82.50	96.67
23	RANGER BN	75.50	75.45	77.14	88.57	73.33	55.62	70.42	80.00
30	RANGER BN	94.12	90.00	92.33	71.43	93.33	69.00	90.83	95.00
31	RANGER BN	89.25	84.71	55.33	66.67	76.67	47.50	79.05	95.00
33	RANGER BN	77.95	75.35	93.33	71.43	73.33	77.24	82.92	77.50
34	RANGER BN	77.86	72.35	95.00	100.00	80.00	47.50	64.17	86.67
35	RANGER BN	84.80	85.71	90.00	100.00	80.00	65.00	74.17	85.00
36	RANGER BN	51.58	87.09	60.00	52.00	60.00	32.31	48.46	56.00
38	RANGER BN	87.50	80.00	85.71	85.00	88.33	74.00	74.23	85.83
51	RANGER BN	78.40	81.54	90.00	0.0	73.33	62.50	73.33	81.67
52	RANGER BN	84.21	73.00	100.00	90.00	80.00	29.09	60.80	62.00
32	RANGER BN	21.28	78.00	85.33	75.56	75.67	56.00	78.26	82.86
41	RANGER BN	68.50	65.40	70.00	60.57	53.33	42.50	62.61	68.33
42	RANGER BN	71.10	85.70	76.67	90.00	73.33	32.22	52.94	78.89
43	RANGER BN	83.75	80.00	73.33	52.00	90.00	69.57	80.00	89.00
44	RANGER BN	64.31	84.67	85.00	71.67	78.33	50.34	64.89	62.50
AVERAGE		77.12	77.45	80.75	75.01	77.92	55.72	71.05	80.56

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Vietnamese Marine Division

Organization	Oper Effec tiveness	PLR/5/ morale	Civil Affairs	Combat Support	Supply Maint	Train- ing	Command Control Staff	Leader Ship
2 Marine BN	83.89	82.50	80.00	77.14	85.00	71.76	83.75	87.62
3 Marine BN	80.50	80.50	90.00	80.00	83.33	68.42	81.08	93.04
5 Marine BN	78.97	83.57	80.00	83.75	80.00	68.89	85.56	80.95
6 Marine BN	92.56	85.60	100.00	100.00	80.00	72.00	71.43	90.91
8 Marine BN	87.62	81.60	90.00	100.00	90.00	77.00	84.44	90.43
1 Marine BN	80.00	76.33	0.0	0.0	75.00	0.0	80.00	71.43
Average	84.86	82.07	88.00	88.18	82.22	71.61	81.04	85.73

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ARTILLERY BATTALIONS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFECTI VENESS	CLASS/ GRADE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
I CORPS								
44 ARTY BN	81.02	87.27	-0.00	-0.00	95.67	75.56	92.50	93.33
64 ARTY BN	84.00	83.64	-0.00	-0.00	93.33	73.33	80.00	80.00
10 ARTY BN	94.78	92.75	-0.00	-0.00	83.33	65.71	71.43	100.00
11 ARTY BN	95.65	93.33	-0.00	-0.00	90.00	62.86	71.43	97.78
12 ARTY BN	96.30	92.73	-0.00	-0.00	90.00	62.86	71.43	95.00
14 ARTY BN	96.52	94.55	-0.00	-0.00	93.33	65.71	71.43	95.56
48 ARTY BN	90.43	88.33	-0.00	-0.00	80.00	54.29	68.57	86.67
62 ARTY BN	92.56	85.71	-0.00	-0.00	86.67	57.14	68.57	89.33
20 ARTY BN	79.05	85.00	-0.00	-0.00	76.67	73.33	75.00	77.14
21 ARTY BN	80.00	86.15	-0.00	-0.00	86.67	71.43	76.67	85.00
22 ARTY BN	78.00	83.09	-0.00	-0.00	95.67	62.86	77.14	80.00
23 ARTY BN	83.48	85.71	-0.00	-0.00	76.67	68.57	80.00	86.08
I CORPS AVERAGE	86.20	87.85	0.0	0.0	84.17	66.14	75.35	88.82

II CORPS

37 ARTY BN	72.73	74.62	-0.00	-0.00	59.00	56.92	75.71	78.00
63 ARTY BN	78.14	77.04	-0.00	-0.00	78.18	57.50	77.33	89.00
220 ARTY BN	72.50	73.85	-0.00	-0.00	77.50	54.67	77.14	80.00
221 ARTY BN	75.31	73.08	-0.00	-0.00	75.33	56.00	75.71	87.06
222 ARTY BN	76.92	73.08	-0.00	-0.00	71.11	50.00	75.71	76.67
223 ARTY BN	77.41	73.85	-0.00	-0.00	61.00	56.00	75.71	78.89
230 ARTY BN	90.43	82.67	-0.00	-0.00	36.67	83.33	87.50	96.00
231 ARTY BN	90.43	78.67	-0.00	-0.00	85.67	83.33	87.50	96.00
232 ARTY BN	90.43	80.00	-0.00	-0.00	36.67	83.33	87.50	96.00
233 ARTY BN	90.43	81.33	-0.00	-0.00	86.67	83.33	87.50	96.00
II CORPS AVERAGE	81.14	76.84	0.0	0.0	78.28	67.04	80.73	87.36

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## ARTILLERY BATTALIONS

ORGANIZATION	TYPE EFFECT TIVENESS	PERKS/ MINALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
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## III CORPS

46 ARTY BN	93.04	83.75	-0.00	-0.00	96.67	94.00	100.00	94.00
61 ARTY BN	92.89	90.97	-0.00	-0.00	93.33	72.00	90.00	95.56
50 ARTY BN	80.00	76.17	-0.00	-0.00	63.00	56.92	74.67	85.00
51 ARTY BN	78.18	77.00	-0.00	-0.00	66.00	50.00	73.33	86.00
52 ARTY BN	78.64	76.80	-0.00	-0.00	70.00	51.43	72.50	84.00
53 ARTY BN	77.72	76.00	-0.00	-0.00	66.00	60.00	72.50	83.00
180 ARTY BN	71.43	69.96	-0.00	-0.00	73.33	56.00	82.50	82.86
181 ARTY BN	82.26	90.59	-0.00	-0.00	90.00	68.00	82.50	90.59
182 ARTY BN	74.55	90.00	-0.00	-0.00	80.00	63.00	82.50	96.25
183 ARTY BN	76.19	69.17	-0.00	-0.00	82.00	62.22	80.00	90.00
250 ARTY BN	89.57	88.75	-0.00	-0.00	83.33	72.00	85.00	90.00
251 ARTY BN	89.57	88.75	-0.00	-0.00	83.33	72.00	85.00	90.00
252 ARTY BN	87.03	88.75	-0.00	-0.00	83.33	82.00	87.50	88.00
253 ARTY BN	90.43	90.00	-0.00	-0.00	83.33	78.00	87.50	90.00
III CORPS AVERAGE	82.08	86.46	0.0	0.0	79.76	68.76	82.54	88.95

## IV CORPS

47 ARTY BN	56.84	84.00	-0.00	-0.00	80.00	33.33	60.00	95.00
67 ARTY BN	70.00	75.38	-0.00	-0.00	70.00	52.86	65.00	68.00
68 ARTY BN	78.18	70.77	-0.00	-0.00	72.00	60.00	70.00	80.00
70 ARTY BN	73.02	81.25	-0.00	-0.00	76.67	41.25	66.25	82.22
71 ARTY BN	75.65	80.00	-0.00	-0.00	83.33	52.00	72.86	86.00
72 ARTY BN	73.33	76.55	-0.00	-0.00	81.67	46.67	65.00	76.84
73 ARTY BN	73.18	81.33	-0.00	-0.00	71.67	54.74	58.57	79.00
90 ARTY BN	71.82	86.25	-0.00	-0.00	31.67	62.00	73.75	91.00
91 ARTY BN	84.10	87.33	-0.00	-0.00	85.00	71.00	85.33	87.00
92 ARTY BN	76.36	83.55	-0.00	-0.00	80.00	61.00	72.50	89.00
93 ARTY BN	74.88	83.75	-0.00	-0.00	69.09	63.00	68.75	84.21
210 ARTY BN	85.91	81.87	-0.00	-0.00	68.33	48.89	64.00	84.44
211 ARTY BN	62.73	41.25	-0.00	-0.00	58.18	53.33	65.83	81.11
212 ARTY BN	62.75	73.94	-0.00	-0.00	61.67	43.08	52.50	73.68

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ARTILLERY BATTALIONS

ORGANIZATION  
EFFECT-  
TIVENESS

PERS/  
MORALE

CIVIL  
AFFAIRS

COMBAT  
SUPPORT

SUPPLY  
MAINT

TRAIN-  
ING

COMMAND  
CONTROL  
STAFF

LEADER  
SHIP

IV CORPS

213 ARTY BN

IV CORPS AVERAGE

63.26

73.94

-0.00

-0.00

61.67

43.08

52.50

73.68

70.00

60.08

0.0

0.0

73.40

52.75

66.16

82.08

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AIRBORNE AND MARINE ARTILLERY

102 ABN ARTY	60.45	65.30	0.00	0.00	93.00	88.33	94.29	88.00
301 MAR ARTY	95.50	91.20	0.00	0.00	95.00	86.00	85.00	94.74
302 MAR ARTY	97.50	91.30	0.00	0.00	95.00	86.00	85.00	97.78
303 MAR ARTY	97.50	93.33	0.00	0.00	95.00	86.00	85.00	95.56
ABN/MAR AVERAGE	93.05	90.31	0.00	0.00	94.50	81.58	87.32	94.02

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ANNEX E

Combat Support Received

This annex presents the totals of various types of combat support received by maneuver battalions, as reported by battalion advisors. Also presented is the "per battalion share", or the total for the major organization divided by the number of maneuver battalions in that organization.

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ORGANIZATION	COMBAT SUPPORT RECEIVED PER AVG BN 3RD QTR CY 70								
	ARTY ROUNDS	NAVAL GUNFIRE ROUNDS	HEL. GUNSHIP SORTIES	FXD WING GUNSHIP SORTIES	TAC. AIR SORTIES	HEL LIFT SORTIES	FXD WING LIFT SORTIES	HEL MED EVAC SORTIES	AIR RESUPPLY SORTIES
1ST DIV	2872.94	32.94	55.4	2.4	61.2	151.5	0	14.8	85.2
2ND DIV	2219.16	0	25.8	0	13.8	283.9	1.3	13.2	32.7
51ST REGT	940.00	0	9.5	.2	9.0	60.5	0	12.5	51.2
MR 1	2400.90	16.96	39.1	1.2	37.6	188.6	.4	13.9	62.0
22ND DIV	1013.13	0	6.6	.1	1.8	63.2	1.5	4.8	54.1
23RD DIV	735.83	0	14.3	.2	.2	100.0	.7	4.4	19.8
MR 2	894.24	0	9.8	.1	1.1	79.0	1.1	4.6	39.4
5TH DIV	2822.50	0	27.7	0	9.5	209.6	0	8.9	17.1
18TH DIV	1560.83	0	8.6	.7	10.7	39.3	0	2.9	2.5
25TH DIV	350.83	0	83.7	.4	.3	292.7	0	8.8	.3
MR 3	1578.05	0	40.0	.3	6.8	180.5	0	6.8	6.6
7TH DIV	4355.00	0	28.8	3.5	2.3	328.9	0	21.0	55.3
9TH DIV	1710.00	0	28.4	1.8	6.4	173.3	0	14.0	21.0
21ST DIV	3243.33	0	61.5	5.9	5.7	313.5	0	11.0	34.2
MR 4	3102.77	0	39.5	3.7	4.8	271.9	0	15.3	36.8
INF TOTAL	2050.97	4.21	33.3	1.4	12.7	185.9	.3	10.4	35.4
AB	1638.88	0	8.8	.1	32.2	59.1	5.4	1.8	35.5
CV	2115.88	23.52	3.1	.7	22.7	6.3	0	7.1	3.8
VNMC	803.33	0	8.8	2.2	6.4	103.1	5.5	3.1	36.5
RN	2114.00	0	42.9	1.3	6.0	271.4	1.6	13.9	37.4
ARVN/VNMC/TOTAL	1984.09	5.10	29.2	1.3	13.5	168.4	.9	9.7	32.8

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ORGANIZATION	COMBAT SUPPORT RECEIVED 3RD QTR CY 70								
	ARTY ROUNDS	NAVAL GUNFIRE ROUNDS	HEL GUNSHIP SORTIES	FXD WING GUNSHIP SORTIES	TAC AIR SORTIES	HEL LIFT SORTIES	FXD WING LIFT SORTIES	HEL MED EVAC SORTIES	AIR RESUPPLY SORTIES
1ST DIV	48840	560	943	41	1041	2577	0	252	1449
2ND DIV	26630	0	310	0	166	3407	16	159	393
51ST REGT	3760	0	38	1	36	242	0	50	205
MR 1	79230	560	1291	42	1243	6226	16	461	2047
22ND DIV	16210	0	105	1	28	1011	24	77	866
23RD DIV	8830	0	172	3	3	1201	9	53	238
MR 2	25040	0	277	4	31	2212	33	130	1104
5TH DIV	33870	0	333	0	115	2516	0	107	206
18TH DIV	18730	0	304	9	129	472	0	35	30
25TH DIV	4210	0	1005	5	4	3513	0	106	4
MR 3	56810	0	1442	14	248	6501	0	248	2401
7TH DIV	52260	0	346	42	28	3947	0	252	664
9TH DIV	20520	0	341	22	77	2080	0	168	253
21ST DIV	38920	0	738	71	69	3763	0	132	411
MR 4	111700	0	1425	135	174	9790	0	552	1328
INF TOTAL	272780	560	4435	195	1696	24729	49	1391	4719
AB	14750	0	80	1	290	532	49	17	320
CV	35970	400	54	12	387	57	0	121	66
VNMC	7230	0	80	20	58	928	50	28	329
RN	42280	0	859	27	120	5429	33	279	749
ARVN/VNMC/TOTAL	373010	960	5508	255	2551	31675	181	1836	6183

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